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4 P R E F A C E  
- 
SOME idea that a Russian Invgsion of India, 
' on a scale adequate to success, was an 
impossible thing, dawned upon me when, 
I serving on the army staff in the Afghan 
War of 1878-79-80, I was brought face to 
face with the difficulties attendant on mov- 
ing and feeding a few thousand men in 
the desert bf Beluchistan and the Afghan 
I mountains ; but *it was not till I began to 
- .  I write a history of that war, that 'he  con- 
1 
I 
ficmatory testimony borne to, the views 
6 
I 
,C whioh I had begun to entertain, by the 
1 wider information gained t o m  the materials 1 placed a t  my clisposal by the kindness of 
( '8  
the Government of India, on the one hand, 
+# 
i 
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I 
1 and by that of private friencls, on the 
, 
I other, gave to them first clearness and 
precision, and then stlch strength and con- 
viction that I felt compelled to lay aside, 
! ,  for a time, the larger work in which, in due 
course, they ~ o u l d  have appeared, in order 
I to combat, at once and directly, the error 
which, so long as it keeps its hold on the 
public mind, must prove a perennial source 
of danger, trouble, and loss to Great 
1 Britain's Indian Empire. 
If I can succeed in convincing iny 
countrymen that the fear of Russia, with 
which they have been so 'carefully inocu- 
I lated, i8 groundless, the hands of the 
I British and Indian Governments will be 
strengthened to resist the ignorant politi- 
cians and ambitious soldiers who are con- 
- 
1 
stantly trying to drive them into wild 





swallow up the proceeds of every fresh tax 
which they may lay upon an already over- 
" 
burdened people, bgsides adding enormously 
to India's indebtedness. In  Tract No. 2 
I shall hope to  sl~ow, in the same practical 
and sober manner in which I have ap- 
e 
proached the problem of a Russian invasion 
of India, how weak and unstable is the 
present frontier of that country, and how 
much weaker and more unstable it has every 
prospect of becoming, if the shaping of 
her foreign policy is to be left in the hands 
which are *guiding it to-day. But what 
I have already *written ought, I think, to 
open the eyes of all intelligent men to the 
fact that every step that we take beyond 
the limits imposed upon our Indian Empire 
by Nature herself, tends to reverse the 
order of things which I have been de- 
picting : the difficulties and dangers which, 
I 
/ 
I X PREFBCE , in case of war between Russia and ourselves, 
I 
t would once ]lave been hers, falling to us;  i ! 
i and the advantages- which we must have 
1 enjoyed, being wilfully handed over to her. n I I I 
I The  inevitable end of the policy which 
I 
. I .  
[ for the last nineteen years we have been 
I 
pursuing on India's north -western and 
t 
northern frontiers is an advance on the 
, Oxus ; and, when that has been accom- 
I 
I plished, our troops ,will be in exactly the / same position as ,my hypothetical Russian 
I Army on reaching the Indus-with their i 
j communications lost, their stores exhausted, I 
with no local source of supply from which 
1 to replenish them, and with a warlike and 
. . I lzostile population in their rear. I do not 0 
t deny that a small British force might pene- 
I 
I trate to the left bank of the great Central 
I Asian stream, but I do dispute that it 1, could accomplish anything when it got 'I 
I 
I 









PROFACE xi I 
I 
there : indeed, there would be nothing for 
1 it to accomplish-Russia being, so far as. I 
we are concerned, invulnerable in Asia, 
I * 
, just as we are invulnerable, so far as she 
is concerned, in India,-and we should have 
exchanged our old frontier, :overed by a , 
I I * river, a desert, and a double range of I 
I I mountains, and close to our own rich and I 
1 populous provinces, for a new frontier, also, 
1 indeed, covered by a river and a desert, I 
I but with those same mountains behind instead of in front of it, and with more 
than 600 miles of the most difficult country 
I in the world between it and the State to whose security it will be supposed 20 con- I [ .  tribute,-and all this merely to forestall e Russia in the possession of territory that i II 
is as useless to her as to us, and which, 
apart from a desire to blihd and delucle 
& 
I !  
- us, she can have no reason for menacing. 
9 
I 
I believe the Russian Government to be 
, 
! 
I fully aware of the hopelessness of any 
r 
scheme for invading- British India, and to 
be free from all intention of making the 
attempt ; but so long as it shares our 
belief that its country and ours are natural 
enemies, so long will it be its aim and 
its interest to embarrass and weaken us in 
Asia. And how can it do this more effec- 
tually than by giving us, from time to 
time, just such sufficient cause for alarm as 
shall induce us to scatter our troops more 
and more widely, and to  squander more 
and more of our moneyo on worse than 
useless Enterprises-or rather India's money, 
a different and far more serious thing, since 
financial trouble, in the case of a country 
administered by a foreign power, means 
. 
political discontent. 
In playing this game, Russia runs no risk. 
I 
... 
PREFACE Xlll  
What does it matter to her whether a few 
thousand British troops are on her side of. 
the Hindu *Kush or not? She lrnows that 
they can never strike at any vital point of 
her dominions, and so can afford to look 
on and laugh in her sleeve whilst our 
generals add 50,000 or 60,000 square miles 
to the British Empire, and the Indian 
Finance Minister raclcs his brain to discover 
some new source of revenue from which 
to pay the price of their militant patriotism. 
As I have said, within their own natural 
boundaries; both States are invulnerable ; 
but Russia has- over us the immense ad- 
i ,~ vantage that she knows her own Security, 
whilst we distrust ours. Whether, however, 
i rn her policy of tempting us on to our hurt I 
is really a wise one, is a very different 
question, and one on which I shall have 
r 
something to say in Tract No. 3. 
I xiv 
One word in conclusion. Many of my 
old brother officers share, I am fully con- s \  
i 
vinced, the views expressed ,in these pages, 
though the trammels of oficial position, or 
preoccupation with other matters, or un- 
willingness to rush into controversy, has 
w 
hitherto kept them silent. T o  one and all - 
of these I now appeal to come forward 
and give me their support in this attempt 
to dispel an error which is endangering the 
prosperity, it may be even the existence, 
of that great Indian Empire which every 
Englishman desires to strengthen and up- 
hold,-none more warmly -than those who 
are notoafraid to resist the temptation to 
extend it. 
0 
H. B. HANNA. 
Marchz~., 1895, 
JUNIOR ARMY AND NAVY CLUB, 
ST. JAMES'S ST~EET,  S.W. 
/ 
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CAN RUSSIA INVADE INDIA? 
C H A P T E R  I 
0 
INTRODUCTORY REMARICS 
THE belief that an invasion of Great Britain's 
Indian Empire by Russia, through Afghan- 
istan, is, if not a probable, at least a possible 
contingency, has more to do than even the 
depreciated rupee with the financial diffi- 
culties of tl-iat great dependency, since it 
is in consequence'of that belief that India's 
frontiers are being steadily pushed Forward 
into regions which can contribute nothing 
to their own administratio% ; that fortifica- 
tions, large and small, are being erected on 
different points of those fronyiers ; that large 
and ever larger numbers of men are being 
concentrated in countries which cannot 
A 
b 
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supply their wants, thus necessitating a 
corresponding increase in military transport 
C 
of all kinds ; and that* railways are being 
constructed at enormous cost, through prac- 
tically uninhabited and uninhabitable wastes. 
I 
Yet that belief is, to this day, only an as- I 
sumption, anfl owes its hold on the public , 
I 
mind largely to the facts enumerated above. 
That viceroys ancl commanders-in-chief in 
India should extend her frontiers, multiply I I 
i her fortifications, isolate her troops in in- 
accessible mountain fastnesses, and sink her I 
money in unproductive railways, is sufficient 1 
in itself to convince most men of the reality l 
and imminence of a danger against which 1 
all the= disastrous precautions have to be 
talten ; and there call be no doubt that they 
, exercise a similarF influence on the minds of 
their own authors. But a belief, however 
firmly held and*however strongly attested, 
should not be accepted as true unless it 
can be shown to rest upon proofs ; ancl this 1 
belief, that India is open to attaclr on her 
north - west frontier, has never yet been 
proved, in the onjyewap which can give it 
a claim to acceptance by reasonable minds, 
viz. by showing how and at what cost she 
can be successfully invaded. 
'. Two men of exceptional mil~tary ]<now- 
leclge and ability, Sir Charles MacGregor 
and Sir Edward Hamley, have, indeed, 
addressed themselves to the task, and 
both, though in very different degrees, 
ended their investigations by giving their 
assent to the popular creed; but the one 
confined his ittention to a consideration of 
Russia's military resources and to the map- 
ping out of her onward movements, *stage 
by stage, without any attempt to show 
# 
under what conditions those movements 
would have to be made ; and the other 
wasted his admirable reaso:ing on erro- 
neous data. 
Now, Russia's capacity to put into the field 
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a force sufficiently large and well-equipped 
. to deserve to be pronounced adequate to 
, so great an undertaking as the invasion of 
I 
I India, is only one of the points which must I 
I be taken into account before we can venture 
1 
I 
to affirm that she will, or may, at some 
1 future time,* actually enter upon it;  and . 
I 
I conclusions which rest upon entirely mis- 
I taken impressions as to the nature of the 
I 
country which Russian forces, marching by 
I ,  way of the Bolan (and Sir E. Hamley 
I 
1 denies that they are likely to come by any 
! 
1 other), would have to traverse, after issuing 
from the mountains, before they could reach 
1 the Indus, carry with theh.1, with respect be 
I it spo&enJ no weight at all. 
Experience, however, I shall be told, is 
I the best of allmproofs, and that India has 
been invaded not once, but many times, is 
I an historical fict which it would be absurd 
I 
1 to question. I 
I No man has more respect for the teachings 
I 
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of experience than I, but if there is one thing 
more than another that I have learnt from , 
d 
it, it is that we are never safe in collnectillg 
conclusions drawn from one set of circum- 
stances with a second set differing from 
the first in any essential particular; and 
surely the difference is enorGous between 
the India of the days of Alexandkr the 
Great, or of Timor the Tartar, or  of Baber, 
or of Nadir Shah, divided, generally in name, 
and always in fact, into many states, each 
actively or passively hostil'e to all the rest, 
and Great Britain's Indian Empire, no 
longer weak by internal divisions, but strong 
in the unity of it$ government, and one for 
all purposes of national defence; *nor is 
there much likeness between the lightly 
equipped, swift-moving bolts ' of Greek, or 
1 In much more recent days, the old style of warfare has 
been witnessed. Captain John W o o 4  of the Indian Navy, 
writing in 1838, tells us, that the forces of Morad Bey, 
the Chief of Icunduz, 15,000 strong, con~posed entirely of 
cavalry, were well adapted to predatory warfare, for which 
Moghul, or Persian, which successfully 
penetrated beyond the Indus, and the 
highly organised, .sloyv ;movbg Russian 
army which we are asked to believe may, 
some day, do the same.' 
I t  sounds a paradox to say that the vast 
improvement that has taken place in the . 
implements and appliances of war since the 
r latest of the successful invasions of India, 
has diminished, to an extent which it is 
difficult to estimate, the probability of her 
ever being invaded again ; yet the seeming 
paradox is a simple truth, which, in the 
course of these pages, I trust I shall be 
neither infantry nor guns were esse'ntial, the horses, though 
small, kv ing  great power, being able to endure much 
fatigue for ten successive days, carrying grain for them- 
selves and riders. But a Russian army could not advance 
upon India after this Ashion.-1-1. B. H. 
' An ancient army had its impedimenta, but these were 
playthings in comparison with the ordnance train of a 
modern army ; the tfil which it inflicts whenever difficulties 
are to be overcome, on the not degenerate soldier of the 
nineteenth century, must be witnessed to be coinpre- 
hended!-Sir H. Durand. 
able to bring home to the minds of my 
readers. 
T h e  belief in vqlnerability of India's 
north - west frontier rests, I repeat, upon 
assumptions, and before it can b e  pro- 
nounced safe to hold or preach it, a minute 
and, careful study must be made of all the 
conditions under which an  invasion of that 
country would have to be carried out. Few 
persons have the time to do this for them- 
selves; I venture, therefore, to  submit to 
all who are interested in the subject the 
results of such a study, uildertalre~l by one 
who, a t  least, possesses this qualification 
for the task-a personal acquaintance with 
the countries he will have to  describe 
and the  difficulties he must weigh and 
estimate.' e 
On the army staff, I marched with General BiddulpliJs 
force by the Bolan to Kandahar, a d  thence to the Hel- 
mand, returning to India by'the Thal Chotiali route ; and 
in the second phase of the war, I was at Kabal, going and 
returning by the Khyber.-H. B. H. 
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I To make my argument siml>ler, c learer ,  $ 1  I 
and, in the end, I hope, I n o r e  convilzcing, 
' I will assume that  ye arme standing w h e r e  
I 
we stood in 1876, when Q u e t t a  was only a 
little Belucl~i town, and when, except 011 1 
the Peshawar side, o u r  north-west frontier ,  
for defensiverpurposes, was practically the ,e 
Indus, borrowing only f r o m  the s i tua t ion ,  
as it is to-day, two  features-the c o n n e c t i o ~ l  
of Peshawar with K a r a c h i  by railway,' and 
the protected bridges at A t t a c k  and S u k k u r ,  
which secure to Our armies t h e  commal ld  of 
both sides of the great r iver  o v e r  wll icl l  
they have been thrown. 
1 The connection between Peshawar  and Multan is a I l1 
doubIe one since the construction of the Sind-Sagar railway, 
I 
j 
on the leff bank of the 1ndus.-H. B. H. i, 1 
1 
t i  
rl 
C H A P T E R  I 1  
I i
INDIA'S NATURAL DEFENCES, AND TI-IE 
I 
\ A '1 
AFGI-IAN PASSES 4 
1 
MILITARY writers recognise three great 
natural lines of defence : a desert, a moun- 
tain range, and a river, the relative value 
of which accords with theaorder in which 
I have placed them, and their absolute 
value, on the extent of the first and the 
number and capacity of its springs ; on the 
height, depth, and ruggedness of the second ; 
and on the width and rapidity of the third. 
Mountains and a river guard the whole 
length of India's north-west frontier, and 
to these for more than threc-fourths of the 
distance is added the desert; whilst each 
of these natural defences is of extraordinary 
0 
strength-the mountains lofty, rugged, and 
barren, their defiles narrow and of great 
length ; the river .wide. and rapid at all 
times, and in the rains, or during the melting 
of the snows, dangerous for boats and im- 
possible to bridge ; whilst the desert varies 
in width fmm 50 miles to 160, and is / 
traversable only on the two or three lines 
along which wells are to be met with. 
From Peshawar on the north-east to 
Dadar on the south-west, the great moun- 
tain ranges whieh form India's first line of 
defence against invasion, are about 650 miles 
in length, and are pierced only by five passes, 
through which any large body of men could 
possibly move. Other so-called roads there 
are, used no doubt by the inhabitants, but 
these are the "merest tracks, from which 
trade shrinks back affrighted, and by which i 
no invader ever has attempted, or ever will . 
attempt, to march. 
T o  these five routes-the Bolan, the Tllal 
Chotiali, the Gomul, the Kuram, and the 
IChyber - we may therefore confine our 
attention, for-if it tag be.showa that through 
none of these is an invasion of the India 
of to-day possible, the most timid Russo- 
phobist will harclly make himself unhappy 
\ about any other; but before sketching the 
distinctive features of each, I must point 
out that the Khyber, the Kuram, and the 
Gomul present quite a different aspect, 
according as tve consider them from the 
point of view of an Anglo-Indian army 
advancing from India to assist or subdue 
Afghanistan; but with no ulterior object, 
or of a Russian army moving down upon 
India. To  us, their length is represented 
by the actual number of miles from Pesha- 
war to Kabul, or from Ratval Pindi to 
Kabul, or from Multan vi2 Dera Isfimael 
K l ~ a n  and Ghazni to Kabul ; to them, Ghazni 
or Kabul are but stages in a journey, 
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Oxus ; and this difference carries with it yet 
I another in the case of the Khyber, namely, 
that to us that route is .open. all the year 
round, whilst to the Russiatls it can be but 
a summer road, since the Ghazili Highlands, 
no less than the Hindu I<ush, are blocked 
by snow from October to April. A'- 
The reason for the distinction which I 
1 have just drawn, the true significance of 
1 which will be apprehended by my readers 
later on, is clear : roe possess in Peshawar, 
or Rawal Pindi,' or Multan, a true base o i  
military operations, and in Kabul or Ghazni 
the Rzssians will possess ndthing of the 
kind. 
Ho% woulcl it be possible, for instance, 
I to concentrate ~oo,ooo or 150,000 troops 
1 at Kabul when !hat city suffers itself every 
I 
i winter from scarcity, and a t  all tirnes llas 
i to draw part ofTts food-supply from Ghazni ? 
1 It could not support the garrison which its 1 
i 
I conquerors must keep within its walls, and 
I 
there would not be a bushel of flour or a ' 1  
pound of meat to spare for the neecls of a 1 
huge field force ; peithqr could the whole 1 
lringdom of Kabul do more than furnish I 
I 
an insignificant fraction of the transport that 1 
would be required to enable it to move. 
- 
-- . Nor can Ghazni be acceptred as such 
an army's starting-point. It, too, must be 
garrisonecl, and that garrison must absorb, 





leaving nothing over for troops passing I 
$ through on their way to *the Khyber, or i 
concentrating there before beginning their. I  
march by the Gomul. I I 
Of course neither at Kandahar nor on I 
the Oxus would Russia possess a t r w  base, 
but as that disadvantage is common to all 
the routes by which her gdvance on India 
must be made, ancl as I have no intention, 1 
and certainly no need, to mrry my inquiry 
I 
i into the difficulties in the way of such an 
i advance, beyond the limits of Afghanistan, 
I 
b 
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I shall not try to determine the exact spot 
where her great military adventure may be 
held to begin.' Fqr my,purppse it will be 
sufficient if I can convince my readers 
that Afghanistan can hardly feed her own 
people, and has nothing to spare to out- 
siders, whether they call themselves con- . / '/ 
querors or friends. A few facts will, 
I thinlr, place my contention beyond 
dispute. 
When the leading column of Sir John 
Keane's army of 9.500 men entered Kandahar 
in I 839, having exhausted its supplies by the 
way, grain rose to thirteen-pence the pound, 
and the inhabitants of the city were reduced 
to  starvation, without relieving the British I 
I t  was not the capture of Sebastopol, nor even the 
immense losses of the Russian armies in the Crimea, which 
compelled the Emperor Nicholas to sue for peace in 1855, 
but the drain on his resources consequent on the having to 
carry on sp vast a Jtruggle in a remote corner of his 
empire; and what is the distance betwecn Moscow or 
St. Petersburg and Sebastopol compared to that which 
separates European Russia from British India?-H. B. H. 
. 
L 
commander o f  the painful necessity of keep- 
ing his troops on half rations.' 
When Sir  I?. Roberts gccupied Kabul in 
September I 8;79, he had with him but 6000 
men, yet he had to  send out troops far and 
wide to gather in supplies for man and 
.beast; and in the process h% drove the 
inhabitants to such fierce despair-for to sur- 
Famines a r e  of frequent occurrence in Afghanistan. 
Dr. Bellew, in his JollrnaZ of n Political Mission to A fgnni- 
stalz, tells us of one  which he witnessed in ICandahar in the 
year 1857. 'Whils t  traversing the filthy lanes of the city 
. . . we had full and  painful proof of tFe sufferings of the 
people from the combined effects of scarcity and pestilence. 
. . . This terrible pestilence and famine continued with 
unabated severity f ~ r  fully six weelrs after our arrival, and 
the daily scenes of hideous suffering we encountered on our 
way to the open country proved a most painful ordeaL . . . 
'The sufferings and privations of the Kandaharisduring 
this famine were really terrible. . . . During this trying 
period we had considerable difficulty in feeding our horses 
and baggage animals, and for several'days could get no 
grain whatever, and but srdall supplies of fodder. The 
price of barley was four seers the rupee, . . . wheat-Aour 
sold at  two seers  the rupee. . . . At suck prices, the poor 
could get no flour at  all, and for several months subsisted 
on clover and lucern, wild herbs and mulberry leaves, 
which they as  often ate uncooked as  coolred.' 
render to us, no matter a t  what price, their 
little stores of grain and bhoosa (chopped 
straw) was to leave the@ families, their live 
stoclr, and themselves, to die of hunger 
during the ensuing winter-that the whole 
country rose in arms against our exactions, 
and, driving before them the detachments. 
scattered through the hills, shut us up in the 
Sherpur cantonments, whence we were on1 y 
released by Sir Charles Gough's bold yet 
well-considered advance from Jugdalali to 
our assistance.'. 
I could multiply instances to prove the 
poverty of Afghanistan, but one general 
statement covers all-with the exception of 
n few hzanrtred seers of ake,  a good dead 
It is true that the attack on Sherpur was delivered and 
repulsed before ~ o ? ~ h  could reach the scene of action, but 
it was the lrnowledge that he was close at hand, and the 
exaggerated rumours as to the strength of his force, born of 
the very audacitymof his advance, which determined the 
moment of that attack, and was the cause of the complete 
disbandment of the tribesmen that followed its failure.- 
H. B. R. 
of f r ~ i t  ahd a little honey, that country 
exforts no food-stufs of any L i d .  This 
fact once grxped,  .it becomes self-evidenl: 
that wherever the base of a Russian army 
advancing upon India by the Khyber or 
the Icuram may be, it is not at Kabul, 
and that I am justified in tr2ating their 
march as beginning at  Kandahar, since I 
am not prepared to complicate the calcula- 
tions which I shall shortly lay before my 
readers, by tracing it backwards to I-Ierat, 
and from Herat to the Caspiin Sea. 
Route I 
From Icandahar to Multan by the Bolan Pass &d the 
Desert of Beluchistan. Distance vid Jacol~abad and 
Suklrur 678 miles, vid Jacobabad, Rajunpoor, and 
Mithankot 606 miles, vid Jacobabad and Dera Ghazi 
Khan 605 miles. 
Since the appearance of Srr H.  awli in- 
son's famous Memorandum up to the present 
day, when the writings of various aclventur- 
13 
ous travellers have brought the roads by the 
Baroghil and Dura Passes into public favour, 
the attention of the politician of-the 'scientific 
frontier ' school has been chiefly absorbed 
by the Bolan route, on the defence of which, 
at  their instigation, a large proportion of 
the vast s m s  of money which have been 
sunk in fortifications and in strategical roads 
and railways has been lavished. 
After emerging from the smiling Kanda- 
har Valley, this route runs for 70 miles 
over a stony *aste, intersected by weird- 
lookillg hills, yet sufficiently open for several 
columns to move over it simultaneously; 
and crosses the Khwaja Amran Range-the 
ascent most precipitous, the descent, except 
near the summit, fairly easy-into the Pishin 
Valley, a tableGnd 5000 feet above sea-level 
' which can scarcely feed a single cavalry 
regiment," arrd in which, for three or four 
marches, the water is brackish. 
Captain C. Hoskyns, R.E. 
There are three roads over the Khwaja 
Amran Range, of varying length and diffi- 
culty, all of .which we. will suppose the 
Russians to use, but after passing Quetta, 
their advance must be made in one long line. 
T h e  Bolan, the pass from which this route 
takes its name, is 59 miles in length, offers 
few camping-grounds, and is in parts exces- 
sively steep and narrow ; in rugged savage- 
ness, and utter barrenness, it may, perhaps, 
be rivalled by othe'r Afghan defiles-to excel 
it is impossible. In the hot weather the 
heat in it is excessive, in the rains it is 
swept by fierce and sudden floods ; the road 
is shingle and grit, strewn with stones and 
small boulders, most trying to the horsa  and 
transport animals, wearing the feet of the 
bullocks to the quick ; and Jgain and again 
the road crosses the river, through which the 
men must wade up to their wafsts in water.l 
And yet the worst dificulties of this route 
1 In one march alone, fourteen times.-IS. B. H. 
I--- - -- - "---- 
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do not begin till the invading army enters on I 
its march across the plain, 160 miles broad, 
which still separates it &om the Indus, the 
plain over which Sir E. Ilamley, misled by 
information obtained ,from ' the best au tho- 
rity '-how one would like to know that 
L 
authority's name !-actually believed troops 
could marc11 'on a wide formation, closely 
accompanied by all their trains and baggage." 
That plain for I 15 miles is either arid desert 
or low jungle, and for the remaining 45 miles, 
pestilential marsh. Wells there are, but a t  
long distances apart, necessitating several 
marches of 16 and one of 2 6 g  miles, and so 
soon exhausted or so difficult to draw from, o n  
accofi~t of their great depth, that the Bengal , 
column of the army of the Indus, already 
mentioned, which n~arched from Shikarpur to 
the Bolan in 1839, had t o  be brolte~l u p  
into eight detachments, the cavalry into half 
Lecture on the Strategical Conditions of our Indian 
North-West Frontier. 
I regiments ; and to crown all, the water ifi ~ I 
I' several instances is so brackish that the f parched horses rduse .to drink it. Near 
1 some of these wells there are villages, each 
f wit11 its tiny plot of cultivated ground, but 
I these can afford no supplies. T o  wander 
i from the traclr which leads frbm one well 
! to another is to lose oneself in an utterly 1 waterless wilderness, and to die either of 
I 
! thirst or by the sword of the Beluchi ! .  robber.'* 
I 
* I-Iow, then, can an advance on a wide 1 
8 
t , formation be a possible thing ? The  actual 
i 
advance will' be in small bodiesj2 which, I 
i struggling painfully forward, must fall an  easy prey to an Anglo- Indian army, w^nethcr 
i 1 ' If the traveller wanders from the right direction, h e  
4 may lose his way and die in the waterless tract. Guides 
7 must always accompany every detachment.'-Major Hough. 
j 
2 ' There is no insunnountable obstaae to the march of a 
I large army' (measured, surely, by Anglo-Indian ideas of I ?' ,I 
1 large) ' Jy .rttlaU detac7znren.t~ nt a tiwc in the cool nzontAs.' 
-Sir H. Haveloclt's Wnv i7z Afi7znnisl~m. 1 1 3 
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its commander elect to meet them at Jacoba- 
bad or a t  Sulrltur. 
Supposing, however, that* the Indian 
military authorities should have cletermined 
to offer no opposition at either of these 
two points, but to defer their attack until 
the enemy %ere still further wealtened in 
strength and red.uced in numbers, our 
invaders, after concentrating at Jacobabad, 
could adopt one of three courses : they 
could cross the Indus at Sukltur and 
march on the left banlc of that river, b y  
district roads and the railway line, to  
Multan, a distance of 328 niiles; or they 
might turn to the north-east and follow 
the fr'ontier road, which runs between the 
desert and the Indus marshes, to the 
Mithanlrot ferry, and thence advance 
upon Multan-distance, 3 r 6 miles ; o r  
lastly, they niight continue on the right 
bank of the river, as far as Dera Ghazi 
Khan, effect ' its passage there, and, so, 
reach Multan, a distance of 255 miles. 
T h e  latter rpute is the shorter, otherwise 
none has any advantage over the others. 
> 
All are alike, unhealthy and destitute of 
supplies, and by each, in addition to the 
Indus, a second great riven has to be 





the Chenab by the third-besides a large 
number of nullahs, most of which must be 
bridged, or ramped, to enable the artillery 
to  cross them. 
There is a shorter road to Rajan- 
poor direct from Dadar, at the eastern 
mouth of the Bolan; but this was provecl 
by the experience of the British troops, 
who had the misfortune to be sent by 
it  in 1878, to be so unfit'for the passage 
I of even a very small force, that we need 
I not lake it into account when consider- ing the possible movements of a large 
I 
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army.l Whether the Russians will venture 
to make use of any of those, which I have 
thought it worth yhile ,to en,umerate, is a 
question on which I shall throw more light 
later on, 
' Route I .  
From ICandahar to Multan, by the Rhojalc Pass, the Pishin 
Valley, the Icakar Ilills, and Dera Ghazi Khan; 
commonly known as the Thal Chotiali Route- 
distance, 459 miles. 
As far as I<illa Abdullah, in the Pishin 
I n  1878 it had been originally intended that both 
divisions of Lhc Icandahar force should m p c h  froin Mithan- 
lcot to  Dadar, but General Biddulph, commanding the 
troops that actually toolc this road, sent back so unfavour- 
able a rgport, that it was hastily decided to divert the main 
body, under General Donald Stewart, to Sukkur, and to 
make the passage of tho desert from that point. Any one 
desiring to obtain a cfear insight into the  conclitions under 
which troops are moved in  Beluchistan, will do well to read 
Biddulph's lecture, entitled ' March from the Indus to the 
Helmand and Baclq' which h e  will find in vol. xxiv. No. 
107, of the Journal ofthe Royal United Service I?rslilutio?z. 
To the accuracy and moderation of this narrative, I can 
myself bear testimony.--H. 13. I-I. 
Valley, this route is identical with that 
which has just been described ; but at  that 
point it diveiges from .it and runs nearly 
due east, first crossing range after range 
of rugged hills, one of which attains a 
height of 8457 feet, and then traversing a 
district, which Sir C. MacGregor has de- 
scribecl ' as consisting chiefly of a hot, 
arid wilclerness, stretching as far as the 
eye can reach, unrelieved by water, trees, 
or even villages.' 
There are low-lying, fairly open valleys 
between the ridges, where the traders, who 
once used this road, may have founcl 
sufficient forage for their camels ; but the 
British field force, which returned to 
India this way in 1879, had to carry not 
only all ordinary suppIies,' but also grain 
for the trailsport animals, and, so long 
ago as 1505, the Emperor Baber com- 
plained of his cavalry having been starved 
in marching by the Thal Chotiali. 
T h e  Indus once crossed a t  Dera Ghazi 
Khan, only 43 miles will separate the in- 
vaders from Multan; .but in  these few 
marches there are two branch channels of 
the Indus t o  cross, the Chenab, and forty- 
five nullahs. The  amount of poiltoons and 
tressels which a Russian army advancing 
into India by any of the five routes, but more 
especially by  the Gomul, the Thal  Chotiali, 
and the Bolan, would have t o  carry with 
it must add enormously to its transport 
difficulties, whilst the endless bridging 
operations would greatly delay its move- 
' I  inents. I 1 
Of ;he Thal Chotiali route, one cannot 1 
say positively that it is impracticable in I 
winter, for in mild seasons i t  occasionally . 1 I 
remains open. yet the uncertainty that I: 
must exist on this point will always deter ?"  
a would-be conqueror of India from relying 
1 upon it as a line of communication with, 





communications, and at least a chance of 
salvation in case of defeat, it would be 
criminal madness to expose ail army, great 
or small, to the chances of war. That 
this would be its position in summer, 
supposing it to enter India in the spring, 
or t o  be able to maintain *itself there 
throughout the cold weather, is certain, 
since no European troops could cross the 
desert, narrow as it is, by this route between 
May and October. 
Rode 111 
From Ghazni to Multan, by the Ghwalari Pass, the Gomul 
River, ancl Dera Ishmacl Kban-distance, 666 miles.' 
This little-known road to India is closed 
at one end by heat in sununer, and at the 
other end by cold in winter. A small 
body of men, if prepared to lose its com- 
munications, even before reaching India, 
The authority for this route is Broadfoot, the only 
European, I believe, who has ever traversed it.-13. I3. I-I. 
and to be l~elpless when it got there, might 
slip through the Gomul after the rains ; but I 
a large army must e i t h e ~  expose its leading 
columns to the pestilential heat of the desert 
in September, or risk being cut in two by 
the snow which begins to fall in the Ghazni 
Highlands in October. In  the matter of 
length, and of the physical difficulties to be 
overcome, it may be classed with the Bolan ; 
and though Broadfoot, who travelled through 
it more than fifty years ago, speaks of ample 
forage for camels, he had in his mind the 
roo0 camels of the trade Kafila to which he 
had attached himself, or, at the most, the 
transport animals of a British regiment, not 
the l~andreds of thousands of beasts of all 
descriptions, without which, as I have 
already said, no' Russian army, numerically 
strong enough to venture into British India, 
could possibly move. The  Gomul has, too, 
like both the preceding routes, the disad- 
vantage of debouching into an arid desert, 
intersected by ravines, ramifying into nuiner- 
ous fan-like branches, which would oblige 
the invaders lo  advance in long unwieldy 
columns, with a coiltracted front, exposed to 
the attacks of the British troops, who would 
be lying perdz~ in the one beautiful oasis 
which. breaks tlie monotony of this desolate 
and deadly plain. Ancl supposing these to 
be driven back and Dera Ishmael Khan 
occupied, they would still be confronted, 
like their friends at Dera Ghazi IChan, by 
the Indus, which they would have to bridge 
in the face of an enemy superior in every 
respect to themselves, with no better pro- 
spect before them, should they succeed in 
gaining the further bank, than that of 
having first to march for yet another four- 
teen days through a c o ~ n b . ~  where, with 
notice to the civil authorities duly given, 
an English regiment may, indeed, count on 
being fed, but out of which the hungry 
Russian host could squeeze not a single 
day's supplies, and which is intersectecl 
by no less than 59 nullahs, five of them 
branches of the Iqclus;, then, to cross the 
Chenab, no mean river, an ope ratio^^ wit11 
which arrnoured steamers, carrying quicli- 
firing guns, might seriously interfere; atlcl 
lastly, to reduce Multan, where our troops 
would be concentrated in overwIleImillg 
force, and which would certainly, by that 
time, have beell stroilgly fortified.' 
Route IV 
From ICandal~ar to Rawal Pindi, by Gliazni ancl Iiahul, 
the Shutagardan and Peiwar Passes, the ICuram 
' Valley, Tlial, Kohat, and 1lushalg&2i-dista~~ce, 649 
miles. 
ThB route may be said to have beet1 
'The Gomul does not present the insuperable difficulties 
of the Icuram, and cotld be made practicable, thoiigh not 
easy, for a column of all arlns ; at the best, it woulcl stiIl 
present much steep, broken extent of traclr, and many 
narrow passes.'-Siu E. Hamley. 
In Hamley's opinion, the issues to this pass might be 
fully secured by the erection, at its mouth, of an entrenched 
camp, armed with heavy artillery.-1-1. B. H. 
invented by Lord Lytton, for it was the 
importance which l ~ e  attached to it, and tile 
part which heassigoed tc, it in the strategy 
of the second Afghan War, which intro- 
duced it to the notice of the vast majority 
of Englishmen. The experience of that 
war proved it to be but ' a byway to Kabul 
and Ghazni';' and, though its original patron 
clung to it to the last, and though Lord 
Roberts has pronounced it a road by which 
an enterprising commander could, at any 
season of the year, push on troops, already 
occupying positions in the Huriab Valley 
between the Peiwar Mountain and the 
Shutagardan, to Kabul 2-an opinion which 
Sir John Watson felt it his duty to*chal- 
lenge "--it would be folly to argue from the 
6 
Lord Roberts' Memorandum, No. r r  ILL., dated 
Kabul, 29th May 1880. 
2 Lord Roberts1 Memorandum. 
3 ' 1 am bound to challenge tlle military advantages of 
the IC~~rarn Route, because I consider that, owing to the 
height of the Sl~utagardan, and the extreme cold in winter 
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fact that, in an emergency, a small British 
force could cross the latter pass in micl- 
winter, to the ccrnclusion that a large 
Russian army might march a t  the same 
season of the year from Kabul to the Indus. 
The one is an operation of a few clays, the 
other of many weeks; ancl though a few 
picked men, well-fed ancl clothed, might 
spend four or five nights in the snow, with- 
out shelter and with the thermometer below 
zero, with impunity, what would be the fate 
of the unclothed transport animals, and the 
half-clad camp-followers, when exposed for 
a far longer period to such 'intense cold ? 
Their advance would be market1 by many 
of the  features of the French retreat from 
Moscow-whol: companies of men ancl 
mules and camels buried in snowdrifts, or 
frozen to death in their sleep ; every mile of 
between that pass and the Peiwar ICotal, it is no use at all 
as a single line.'-Memorandum of Sir J. Watson, dated 
I<uram, 24th July 1880. 
the road strewn wit11 the bodies of tl1ose 
who had perished of fatigue and exhaustion, 
or been slain. by rhe rtavage and hardy 
tribesmen, who, themselves unseen, would 
never lose sight of the invaders, and be 
always at  hand to swoop down on every 
bewildered straggler, every worn-out trans- 
port animal, to cut the throat of the one and 
carry off the ,burden of the other. 
But why,' the impatient reader may 
exclaim, 'why try to relieve our fears by 
picturing misfortunes which will never over- 
take our foes, since Russian commanders 
are not so mad as to choose the winter for 
an advance upon the Indus viri Thal ? ' 
I admit it, but then that adrnissiGn is 
tantamount to an assertion of my belief that 
by this route, as by the Gomul and the Thal 
Chotiali, they will never invade India at all ; 
for if they time their march,' as they un- 
doubtedly must, to reach that river at the 
end of the rains, the passes through which 
C 
they had come would immediately close 
behind them, forbidding alilte both succour 
and return. • 
Still, granting, for argument's salte, that a 
Russian army might some day hazard an 
advance on India by the Kuram route in 
the hot weather and the rains, its fate woulcl 
be harclly more enviable than if it were to 
malce the attempt in midwinter. What 
with burning sun and scorching winds be- \ 
tween Kandahar and Kabul ; what with the 
two great passes, one of them I I,  500 feet 
high, and the terrible Hazaar Darakht 
Defile ; what with floods, chblera, and fever 
in the Kuram ValleyI1 that army must in- 
1 'I tTthe occupation of the I<uramValley] 'has proved very 
unhealthy to native troops.'-Lord Roberts' Memorandum. 
'General Roberts lays much stress on the great heat 
between Jamroocl and Gandamuclr. I am inclined to think 
that from 1cohat to Kuram it is, though not quite so bad, 
yet nearly equal in temperature. Last year our troops, 
marching down tce ICl~yber, suffered terribly. Our troops 
did not marc11 down froin Icuram, but the Punjxb con- 
tingents did, suffered much fro111 heat, and lost 50 Sepoys 
from cholera.'-Sir J. Watson. 
evitably be  thoroughly exhausted before 
reaching Thal, where our troops, fresh, 
healthy, well-fed, well-equipped, would cer- 
tainly be awaiting them. And if, to carry 
a my concessions yet a little further, no 
attempt were to be made to destroy the 
invaders at  this point, and, dragging with 
them their innumerable sick, they were to 
be  allowed to toil on, unmolested, save by the 
savage inhabitants of the neighbouring liills, 
who would harass them incessantly, ancl 
fatten on their spoils ; ancl if they were to  
possess themselves of Kohat, and to defeat 
the  force mardhing from Peshawar, by way 
of the Kohat Pass, which would take them 
in flank and rear, and were once "more 
to press forward through a rough, barren, 
sparsely region1 to  the Indus at 
Kushalgarh, what chance would they have 
of ever bridging its stream ? And if, still 
adhering to  the policy of leaving Nature to 
1 Lord Roberts' Memorandum. 
fight our battles, w e  were to suffer them to 1 
carry out this operation, they would find 1 
the country on its- left bank no more kindly 1 
or hospitable than that on its right, and be 1 
unable to halt for rest and re-organisation, \ 
much as they would need both before 
risking an advance on a gi-eat fortress, that 
coulcl not be carried by a co~@-de-mai~z, and , 
yet must be captured a t  once, if its besiegers 
are not all to perish of hunger before its 
walls. 
Surely I a111 justified in thitllcing that this 
unexaggerated picture of the difficulties 
which bes& the Kuram road gives rile the 
right to erase it also from the list of routes 
by %hicll Russia can invade our Indian 
Z 
Empire ? 
1 ' I t  is not likely, I~owever, that any strategist invading 
I 
India fro111 his base (as it must,be) at Iinbul, would attempt 
i 
I 
to operate on a line 1-26 i~liles long, while we held a parallel 
one only 104. ~ c e r e  need be  little fear of an invasion by 
the JCt~ran~ line.'-Sir J. Watson. 
'The issue of this pass in our territory at Thal is r o o  
miles from that of the I<hyber. A column so strong and I 1 
i 
From Kandallar to Peshayr, by Ghazni, and ICabul, and 
the ' Latalland, 'the ~u~dala l ;  and Khyber Passes- 
distance, qgo miles? 
This line of advance is so superior to 
all the rest, in that it debouches from the 
mountains, not into the deseat like the 
Eolan, the Thal Chotiali, and the Gomul, 
nor into a rough sterile district like the 
Kuram route, but into the cultivated fertile 
1% valley of Peshawar, that it can be no matter I 
of surprise to LIS to find that it has been 
acloptecl by nearly every invader from Alex- 
ander to Nadir' Shah. . 
Except the Thal Chotiali road, it is also 
the shortest, nevertheless it is long e&ugh . 
well equipped as to be independent c2uld not pass here, 
one that could not act independently would scarcely venture ; 
and it is not likely, therefore, that any serious attack will 
be made by way of the Kuram.'-Sir E. Hamley. 
1 There is another road from Kabul to*Jellalabad by the 
I 
I 
Khurd Kabul Pass, but this is longer and more tortuous. , I  
Our army used it in the first Afghan War, and began by 
using it in the second, but soon abandoned it.-II. I3. H. I 
t o  entail upon any force that should advance 
by it the same climatic difficulties as have 
t o  be faced by t h e  Icuram. -By it, too, the 
Russians would have to suffer from sun and 
wind in the summer, from floods in the rains, 
and from sickness at most stages of their 
journey ; ancl though there is no Shutagardan 
to surmount, the Lataband, the Jugdalak, 
and IChyher Passes are more difficult and 
fatiguing than the Bolan, nor are the tribes 
less warlike and greedy of plunder. 
There is an open valley at Jellalabad 
where the two or three leading regiments 
might obtain a few days' sup'plies (we have 
already shown that Ghazni and Kabul could 
afforb them none), but what are a few days' 
supplies for a ,couple of thousands of men 
compared to the boundless necessities of a 
couple of hundred thousands, on a march 
which must kxtencl over several months ? 
They would not make the difference of 
fifty camels to the transport department. 
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There are several positions in the passes 1 
which it would be easy to  defend, notably 
Lundi Kotal,, a t  the w~s te rn  end of the 
I 
Khyber ; but there would be no need for us 
to take advantage of these, since a fortified 
camp at the eastern mouth of that pass, 
almost within sight of our bas$, Peshawar, 
would seal it so effectually, that Sir E. 
Hamley was not exaggerating when he said 
that he did not see how a single Russian 
regiment could ever issue from it ; and this ! 
being the case, I may count the Khyber also 
as a route by which no invasioil need be I I 
feared. Nevertheless, so well aware am "1 
I of the existence of persons whose I i 
confidence in Russia's power to accomplish 1 
any object on which she has set her heart, I 
' I  
let Nature oppose her as she may, I shall 
have hitherto failed to shake, that I will now 
proceed to make assurance doubly sure by 1 
showing the nature of the obstacles to an  i 
invasion of India which are inherent in the I 
+ -  
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constitution of a modern army; and as 
the Bola11 route, notwithstanding its great 
length, offers the ,advantage that a force 
, advancing by it may possibly retain its 
communications for a short time after en- 
tering the country which it has come to 
wrest from .us, o r  at least to raise against 
us, that shall be the road along which I now 
invite my readers to follow the fortunes of 
our Russian friends, though not denying 
to them the liberty t o  use other lines of 
advance in combination with this one, 
should there appear to be any advantage 
to them in cloing so. 
C H A P T E R  I11 
SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT I 
4 
I IIAVE already let it appear that I believe 
the whole question of the feasibility of a 
Russian invasion of India to hinge upon 
considerations of supply ancl transport, but 
before addressing myself to this subject, i t  
will be i~ecessary to determine the size of I 
the army for which supplies and transport 
will have to  be provided, dividing it into 
four categories :-first, troops garrisoning 
Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul-in a word, 
0 
occupying Afghanistan ; seconclly, troops 
engaged in lreeping open communications 
between Herat and Kandahay and between 
the base or bases of operations and, the 
armies in the field; thirdly, troops actually 
41 
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taking part in the invasion ; fourthly, troops 
in reserve. 
In the first category .we must place not 
less than 40,000 men, viz. ~o,ooo at Herat, 
10,ooo at Kandafiar, and 20,000 at Kabul, 
this larger figure being made necessary by 
the fierce afld fanatical character of the 
people of that city, and also by the fact 
that, during six months of the year, its 
garrison must be self-sufficing, as, both the 
road to the nortl~ and that to the west 
being closed by snow, there would be no 
possibility of reinforcing it either from the 
Oxus or from Kandal~ar. 
The lines of con~munication would 
absol-b, at a moderate computation, 30,ooo 
men ; and, considering the wear and tear to 
which the invading armies would be sub- 
jected on their march, and the nature of the 
opposition that they must be prepared to 
encounter at the end of it, ~ ~ o , o o o  will not 
be too many to assign for the actual in- 
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vasion of India, supposing one route only 
to  be used, or 200,000 if two routes, or 
230,000 if three routes are used; for it 
must not be forgotten that, on the two latter 
suppositions, although our troops, like those 
of Russia, would be divided, our power of 
concentration would be great, w d  theirs, nid. 
Finally, a reserve of 50,000 men would be  
necessary, since, in case of disaster, not a 
soldier could be taken from the garrisons or 
from the lines of communication, either for 
the purpose of reinforcing the defeated 
army or of covering its retreat. 
Thus, assuming that the advance will 
take place by the Bolan alone, we shall 
have 270,000 fighting men and2taking 
the proportion of camp-follpwers, which our 
campaigning experience has shown to be 
indispensable, viz. I 0,000 to every I I,  500 
soldiers-2 34,7 82 non-combatants to feed, 
during a period of time which would cey- 
tainly extend from three months before the 
- 
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actual advance on India until the invading 
force, having possessed itself of Multan, 
might be at last i~ a qosition to supply 
some, at least, of its own wants on the spot. 1 
The whole of this calculatioll might be 
worked out, but to follow me through it 
would be  sp great a weariness to the 
reader, that I shall confine lnyself to show- 
ing what would be the amoullt of supplies, 
expressed in camel-loads, which the I 50,ooo 
men of the field army must carry with 
them from Randahar to Multan by Jaco- 
- i 
I 
babad ; and, as  time is a chief factor in 1 
t this calculation, my first step will be to 
ascertain how long it will talte the aforesaid 
I 150,om men to accomplish this march. 1 T h e  distance from Kandahar to Dadar, at the south-east mouth of the Bolan, is twenty, 
/1 
! from Dadar to Jacobabad eight, from Jaco- 
i babad to Multan twenty-two marches, fifty in i all, and the speed a t  which the invaders can 
I advance will be regulated by the number i 
# 
SUPPLY AND. TRANSPORT 45 
of men who can pass through the narrowest 
portion of the road in a day.' Notl~ing 
would be gained 'by sending them from 
Kandahar to  Quetta in bodies of say 6000 
men, if, on arriving at the latter town, each 
body had to  be divided into two, of which 
the second must wait a day before it could 
follow the first; indeed, in many respects 
the advance would be easier if macle in two 
As there are persons to whom the truth of this axiom 
may not be self-evident, I will prove it by a simple example. 
Let us s ~ ~ p p o s e  two bodies of twelve men each, the first, A, 
marching in line, the second, B, in single filc, moving at auni- 
form pace, and in such a way that the line A is parallel with 
the lending mnn of file 13, to be approaching two gateways, 
through each of which only one Inan can pass a t  a time ; at  
the rate of five seconds to each man, it will take each body 
sixty seconds, or one minute, to clear its gateway; but, if 
body A has widener1 out into line once more, it will resume 
its march, no longer parallel with the leading man of body 
13, but with its last man, and every Lime a similar gateway 
had to be traversed it would be attended by a loss of 
fifty-five seconds, so that it would graduaIly fall behind 
body B. If, instead of a gateway, 'narrow lanes were 
entered, each body would remain in the single file forma- 
tion, and neither would have gained any advantage over 
the oLher.-H. B, H. 
detachments, a day's march apart, from the 
outset. 
I will take 3000 troops, that means 3000 
fighting men, with their accompanying 
camp-followers and transport animals, as  the 
highest number that can enter the Bolan in 
any one day, 
This will divide our invading army into 
fifty detachments, each a day's march behind 
its predecessor ; to these fifty days we must 
add fifty more for the distance to be  tra- 
versed, and the result will be IOO days as 
the shortest possible time in which to move 
a force of rSo,ooo men, with all its trains, 
supplies, and followers, from Kandahar to 
Multah ancl concentrate it there, ancl 75 as 
the average nupber of days during which 
each detachment woulcl require to be fed, 
either on the march or whilst waiting at the 
encl of it for the whole army to be once more I 
reunited ; and we are now in a position to de- I 
termine the amount of transport with which 
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it must be furnished, taking, as tlie basis 
of our calculations, with the omission of the 
small decimal, '05, the very low scale which 
Major Hough tells us was in force ir7. the 
army of the Inclus in the year 1839, viz. one 
camel, or two mules, for the conveyance of the 
food of every fighting man for tbirty days l- 
1 This estimate gives only 2 lbs. of rice or flour, it Ib. 
dhal, & lb. ghee, and a little salt, per diem, to every fighting 
man  or government camnp-follower, and I lb. flour or rice, 
p Ib. dhal and a little salt, to each private follower. In 
Sir  Donald Stewart's force in 1878-79, where the diet boll1 
for troops a n d  camp-followers was more liberal, the pro- 
portion of camels to fighting men was as I man to 1'18 
camels, but even  in this calculation no provision is made 
for the carriage of meat, or spirits, or tea, or sugar, or 
hospital comforts of any kind for the men, nor yet for com- 
pressed hay f o r  the horses, nor far grain for the transport 
animals. In a n  Anglo-Indian division of 12,500n1en RI which. 
only the Europeans receive meat, theybeing in the proportion 
of seven Englishmen to sixteen natives, less than one to two, 
1000 sheep ancl  820 b~~lloclrs are consumed per mensem. 
Therefore, t he  requirements of an army of 15o,ooo, ineat 
being consumed by them in the same proportion, woulcl 
demand 12,000 sheep and 9840 bullocksfor one inonlli, ancl 
30,000 sheep and 24,600 bulloclrs for two months and a half, 
o r  its equivalent in tinned meat, for the carriage of which 
mules or camels  must be provided.-H. B. H. 
the term iighting man to be ullderstood to 
include, not only the soldier himself, but his 
share of the camp-i;olloi@ers and his portion 
of all the cavalry horses and gun cattle 
belonging to the force. Two simple pro- 
portion sums will give us the inforination we 
need; the first tells us that as thirty days' 
supplies are to I camel, so are seventy-five 
days' supplies to two and a half camels; 
the second tells us that as one man is to 
two and a half camels, so are I ~o ,ooo  men 
to 375,000 camels, or to double that number 
of mules-in other words, that i t  will require 
;375,000 camels, or 750,000 mules to carry 
the barest necessaries of life for the Russian 
armyewhich should attempt to invade India 
vi2 the Bolan. . 
Next we must make provision for the 
carriage of tents, hospitals and all their mis- 
cellaneous eqcipments ; for the solclikrs' and 
officers' kits, for cooking utensils, entrenching 
tools, stable gear, palthals (sltins for the con- 
SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT 49 
veyance of water), for ammunition, for sap- 
pers' and heavy gun equipments, for engineer 
and artillery parks, for pogttoon train, and for 
the thousand and one etceteras without which 
a modern army cannot stir. In the Afghan 
War  of I 878-79-80, our artillery and engineer 
parks were very light, and we ha4 no regular 
pontoon train, just a few pontoons, yet the pro- 
portion of transport for all the impedimenta, 
which may be classed under the general 
name of baggage, was -574 camel for each 
fighting man. W e  will make it half a camel, 
which will add under this head ;'5,000 
camels, or 150,ooo mules, to the transport 
engaged in carrying food ; and lastly, if the 
whole expedition is not to brealr down-long 
before it reaches the Pishin Valley, provision 
must be made for the feeding of the trans- 
port animals themselves. 
In the first phase of the second Afghan 
War, when such provision was neglected, the 
Bengal army alone lost 50,000 hired camels, 
D 
besides a large number belonging to Govern- 
ment ; how many mules and ponies I have 
not been able to ascertdn, but the mortality 
among them must have been great, since, 
on the renewal of the war in September 
1879, it was found that the whole of the 
original tragsport had practically disappeai-ed, 
and India had to be scoured, from the 
Punjab to the Delrkan, to provide carriage 
of any descriptioi~ for the small British 
armies advancing on Kabul. Experience, 
however, had worked repentance, and re- 
pentance, amendment ; for, during the second 
phase of the war, 6 lbs. of grain per diem 
was allowed to each transport animal, 
whether camel, mule, or pony-an extremely 
moderate alloyance, below which it would . 
not be safe for the Russians to go.' 
I must insist again on the fact that there is,  practically, 
no forage along this, or any other route through Afghanistan. 
When travellers talk of plenty of grazing for camels on cer- 
tain stages of this or that journey, they have in their minds 
the Icafilas, which, at certain' seasons of the year, traverse 
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Six pouilcls  of grain per diem for 450,000 
camels = 2,700,000 Ibs.: which figure n~ulti- 
plied by 75 ,  the number .of days for which 
we have to provide, gives 2 0 2 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  lbs. 
as the amount of grain that will have to 
accompany the army of the Bolan ; ancl as a 
camel is reckoned to carry four ,mauncls ,  or 
320 lbs., and a mule half that load, we must 
add to our former iigures 632,812 camels, or 
the Afghan passes, and which number perhaps 1000 or 1500 
camels. For these there inay now and again be sufficient 
forage; but let not 1500 but If;,ooo pass along the same 
road, and there will not be a bite left for the hundreds of 
thousands that, in the case of a great army, have still to 
follow. And even where forage of some kind exists, I can 
affirm, from my own experience, that there is frequently no 
time for grazing. On the march, of course, there can be 
no halting; full or starving, the unhappy beasts, strung 
together nose to tail in one long line, must struggle on till 
the camping-ground is reached, often-too late for their 
drivers, after removing their burdens, to take them out to 
feed. I have seen hundreds of camels sink. down when 
relieved of their loads, which they had borne for nine or 
ten hours at  a stretch, and die of hunger and fatigue, or 
fall dead on the march, leaving their burdens to be piled 
on the backs of their already overweighted companions.- 
H. B. W. 
1,265,624 mules, when our calculatioil will 
stand thus :- 
Carncls h1 ulrs. 
For carriage of faod: .* 375,000 750,000 
,1  , 1  baggage, . 75,000 1~0,000 
$1 ,, grain, . 632,812 1,265,624 
-- -- 
Grand total, , 1,082,812 2,165,624 
Of course camels carrying grain can no 
more live without food than camels carry- 
ing supplies or baggage, but I need hardly 
pursue these calculatio~ls further, the figures 
I 
at which we have already arrived being, I 
. . 1 
vetlture to hope, sufficient to convince all I 
I 
sane minds that India has notl~ing to fear I 
from such a force as Sir E. Hamley was 
I 
contemplating when he wrote : ' Wc may 
be  assured that an invading army of India, 
such as we c ~ n n o t  afford to clespise, will be ' 
no ilnprovised force, no barbarous horde, 
but truly formidable in numbers, organisa- 
tion, and le'adership.' Strong as this part 
of my case is, however, I will yet call my 
reader's attention to the fact that in the 
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movement of these 280,000 men-150,000 
combatants and I 30,000 non-combatants- 
and these 1,082,8 I 2 *camels, I have allowed 
for not a single hitch, for not one day's 
delay. And what delays, what hitches 
there would be, should the problem we are 
considering ever be transferredqfrom paper 
to real life ! Delays from the sudden floods 
which sweep down the Bolan, from sickness, 
from the sheer exhaustion of the heavily 
laden and underfed cattle, from collisions 
with the Tribesmen-above all, from the con- 
fusion which, do what one may, must reign 
it1 so great a multitude, cooped up in a 
narrow space, and struggling, up-hill and 
down-hill, over rough and stony ground. 
What the siclrness would be, it is appalling 
to contemplate, for the condition of the roads, 
and still more of the camping-grounds, would 
be one of indescribable filth ; >nd when, to 
1 Surgeon-General Alexander Smith, C.B., in his admis- 
able report on the Medical Administration of the Afghan 
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the  ordinary effluviz polluting the air, we 
add that arising froin the carcasses of the 
dead beasts with v~hicli the road woulcl soon, 
be strewn, who can doubt that cholera, dy- 
sentery and fever would soon be rife among 
t r o o ~ s  and camp-followers, ancl that many 
l a halt wo~dd become necessary to succour 
I 
I the sick and bury the dead ? As for col- 
lisions with the Tribesmen, I know it is the 
I 
i fashion, in alarmist circles, to take it for 
granted that the Russians would advance - - 
through a friendly population, uilharassed I 
and unopposecl, but I have never been .able 
to discover the smallest ground for the 
Campaign, refers to the extremely foul state of the camping- 
grounds from their previous occupation by ICafilas, and 
tells of the difficulty which the small British force, which 
he  accompanied u p i h e  Bolan, experienced, in finding any 
t hitherto unused plot of land on which to pass the night, l 
and how, on one occasion, it had to descend into the 
1 
1 
I shingly bed of tae stream, where the water lay at a very I 
short distance beneath the surface, and pitch its camp there, I 
at the risk of its sharing the fate of the sappersl camp 
in the first Afghan War, which was swept away by a 
freshet.--1-1. U. H. 
assumption. T h e  hatred of Englishmen 
which is said, perhaps truly, to burn fiercely 
in every Afghan heart, is not of Englishmen 
as Englishmen, in contradistitlction to other 
Europeans and Christians, but as members 
of the State which has twice carried famine 
and slaughter through their land; and if 
there is such a thing as persistency in 
national character, or in human nature 
itself, nothing is more certain than that 
the moment the Russians enter Afglianistan, 
as we e~ltered it, sword in hand, they will 
be regarded with the same abhorrence, and 
meet with the same opposition. What 
Prince Lebanoff said of Shere Ali-' He 
/ 
was neither Russian nor British, but an 
Afghan, anxious to preservc the independ- 
ence of his country '-is true of every Afghan 
to-clay; and our own experience of the 
difficulties attendant on twc attempts to 
subjugate them should save us from under- 
1 
estimating those which certainly await the I I 
Russians sl~ould they ever venture on the 
same taslr. 
But the plundel* of India! that dazzling 
bait, which Russia will flash before the eyes 
of Asia; which, according to Sir C. Mac- 
Gregor, is to draw to her banners ' every 
ruffian from$he Caspian to the Indus, whose 
shoe-leather would hold out long enougll t o  
enable hiin to join them,' will it not disarm 
Afghan hostility ? will not Ghilzais and 
Duranis, I<alrars, and Afridis sweep down 
upon the rich plains of the Punjab and 
satisfy, at one and the same time, their 
greed and their revenge? Honestly, I d o  
not think they will, not from laclr of inclina- 
tion, perl~aps, but from lack of power. Eve11 
rufFians must eat to live, and how these 
volunteers are to get food, seeing that a l l  
the grain of central Asia and Afghanistan 
wiIl have been swept into the Russian 
granaries, and how they are to carry sup- 
plies if they could obtain them, when e v e r y  
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four-footed creature that can bear a load 
on its baclc will have been seized for the 
Russian transport service, it is hard to un- 
derstand. But supposing these little diffi- 
culties overcome, and that every ruffian has 
his camel or his mule to carry his supplies 
and supplies for it to carry, will&hese hordes 
be more welcome allies in the van of the 
invading army, or in its rear ? In the van, 
like a swarm of locusts, they will strip the hill- 
. -. sides of every leaf, the valleys of every blade 
h of grass, with which the Russian comrnis- 
sariat and transport departments had hoped 
to elce out the insufficient grain allowance of 
some at least of their unhappy beasts; in 
the rear, they will soon discover that it is 
easier and more profitable &o lay hands on 
the wealth moving before their eyes, or 
abandoned by the wayside, than to toil . 
through the desert in the wildohope of loot- 
ing British India. 
The  Russians, if they are wise, will decline 
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the services of all such untrustwortl~y auxil- 
iaries, and keep them at  a distance by very 
summary measures-; a d  if, as MacGregor 
anticipated, they succeed in raising a body 
of 20,000 fighting men in Afghanistan, these 
will form part of the regular forces whose 
fortunes we 11ave been tracing, and share the  
difficulties which we have shown illust prove 
fatal to their enterprise. 
But belief in the impossible dies hard, and 
the statesmen and military men, and still .- . . 
i 
more the general public, with whom the 
..hb 
possibility of a Russian invasion of India 
has long been an article of faith, driven I 
from the roads, will, I am well aware, fall I 
back upon railways. A chorus of voices 
will remind me that before Russia will 
address herself to the invasion of India, 
she will have smoothed the way for the 
advance of h'er armies by the construction 
of railways on a gigantic scale. From the 
Caspian to Herat, from Herat to Kandahar, 
I 
I 
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from Kandahar to  'Kabul, and thence on 
to Gundamak in the one direction, and to I 
the foot of tlie Khfvaja Amran range (it is 
Sir C. MacGregor's guidance that I am 
f~l lowing) ,~  there would be one unbroken 
line, along which soldiers 'and stores will be 
forwarded swiftly and safely when the hour 
shall strike for Russia to carry into effect 
the plans, which she is credited with having 
nourished for the last hundred years or 
more. 
I will not stop to calculate, even in the 
roughest manner, what such a programme 
would cost in time and money, but accept 
the axiom of Sir C. MacGregor, that where 
1 ' Russian railways would have been made from Farah 
to the west foot of the IChojak, as far as possible from the 
Oxus towards Kabul, and from 1~ab;l to Gundamuclr, and 
from Kabul to Kandahar, and from this line to the head of 
the Gomul. A good cart road would have been made 
from Herat to Kabul direct, from U s h  to Chitral, and on 
down the Kunar valley ' (MacGregor). These vast prepara- 
tions would entail the construction of about 1800 miles 
of railway and 1650 miles of cart road through barrqn, 
regions and over lofty mountains.-H. B. H. 
warlilre objects are in question, money is 
always forthcoming. Assuming, then, that 
the necessary number of millioils has been 
flung into this gulf, ancl that, at the end 
of a given time, say twenty years from 
to-day, his railway scheme has been realised, 
we will now bquire what influence this fact 
would exercise on the amount of supplies 
ancl transport which the invading army must 
carry with it from Kandahar, or find awaiting 
it at  Quetta, where we will suppose the 
terainus of the line to be. If, by making 
use of the railway up to that point, a saving 
of time were effected, there might be a 
corresponding diminution under these heads. 
But how do the facts stand ? 
It takes roo drains, with an average of 
30 vehicles per train, to move an English 
division of I 2,500 men of all arms, with 
their haggage,'tents, and ammunition, etc., 
and with full transport for the conveyance 
of the said impedimenta, but with no siege 
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* 
or pontoon train, and without supplies either 
for troops, cavalry horses, gun cattle, or 
baggage animals. .To ,move 150,000 men, 
under the same conditions, 1200  trains 
would be required. Now, nine up and 
nine down trains is the greatest number 
that can be run on our military lines, beyond 
the frontier ; but I will supp&e Russia to 
possess more rolling-stock and to manage 
her traffic better than we do, and that she 
. .. 
will therefore be able to run twelve trains 
M each way in the twenty-four- hours, instead 
of nine, on which basis it will take her 
exactly IOO days to bring her army from 
Kandahar and concentrate it at the point 
where its march must begin, whither a 
portion of its supplies will have preceded it 
4 
by train, whilst the remainder will be pour- 
ing in by road ; the proportion of train-borne 
and camel-carried supplies being determined 
by the amount of transport which will be 
required when the army starts from its new . 
base, for as the transport animals, except 
the  . /~,ooo allotted to the baggage, which i 
accompany the troops (be it noted, in pass- i 
I' ing, that this figure requires doubling, as mules would have to be substitutecl. for ? ' 
1 carnels),l must perforce make the whole I'   
1 journey on foot, it would be a waste of G f power to  1ef them perform its first stage 
Under any circumstances much of the transport nlust 
consist of mules, ponies, and bullocks, not only on account 
of the impossibility of procnring the enormous number or 
camels that woulcl be required, but also because the latter 
animal is ill-adapted to a journey which begins in the liigh- 
lands of Afghanistan and ends in the deserts of Beluchistan. 
' It  was ordered,' wrote Sir Michael Kennedy, Controller- 
General of Transport and Supply, in his valuable Report of 
OcLober 6th, 1880, ' that preference should be given to 
mules and ponies, restricting as nlucb as possible the 
acquisition of camels ; for the experience of the prcvious 
campaign had demonstrated that the camel of the plains 
was unsuited for tly; hard work and rigorous climate 
baggage animals would have to endure . . . in northern 
Afghanistan! [This is as true of the camel of the plains of 
t h e  Oxus as  of his, kinsmen of the plains of the  Indus.] 
' Subsequent experience has also shown that the hill camel 
is very little better, at least in our hands ' [would Russian 
hands be gentler ? ]  ' and in the manner we are compelled 
to work him with troops.'-H. B. H. 
unladen, so that only such supplies as 
exceed their carrying capacity will have 
been previously acc~mu1,ated at Quetta.' 
Now, as Kaildahar is twelve marches 
from Quetta, I 50,ooo men, marching in 
bodies of 3000, would concentrate a t  the 
latter town an the 62nd day, and the 
average during which the whol; force would 
require to be fed, either moving or waiting, 
would be 37 as against 50 if the journey 
were performed by rail ; and a force march- 
ing by road to Quetta would have an 
advantage over a force conveyed thither 
Return of the Russian Army of the Bolan, as moved 
by rail, calculated on the basis of an Anglo-Indian 
division :- 
In India we allow sick carriage(Dhoo1ies and Dhandies) at 
5 per cent. for troops and I per cent, for followers.-H.B.H. 
Cavalry 
Horses and 









by rail as regards time, which means for 
the latter an absolute increase in supplies, 
whilst in the m a t f e r  of transport the de- 
crease, if any, would be so small as to 
exercise no appreciable influence upon the 
problem we are trying to so1ve.l 
But even if the balance of advantages 
were the o?her way, it would be unwise 
to move an army by rail in a country 
where, owing to the nature of the ground 
and of the climate, landslips and floods are 
of frequent occurrence, and where warlike 
tribes, hungry for spoil and enraged at the 
'Railways arc undoubtedly wanting in some of the 
characteristics of a good line of co~nmunication ; we should 
regard them as nothing beyond excellent lines of supply. 
They can never supersede tlie ordinary roads in war, as 
these are indispensgble for inarching and manceuvring, 
and are the only lines by which an army, compelled to 
retire, can fall back on its reinforcements a n d  reserves!- 
The Organisation and Ad~ninistration of Lines of Co7;lz- 
~lz?inication i g z  Ww, by Colonel G. H. Furse, C.B. The 
Etappen or Staging system, like the railway, could be used 
only as  far as Quetta, and would give little relief to the 
transport.--13. B. H. 
I- 
SUPPLY AND & TPAMSPORT 65 
occupation of their territories, would border 
the line in its whole length, to guard against 
whose raids it musb be, strongly patrolled 
from end to end, by night as well as by 
day. However slrilful the Russian en- 
gineers, however vigilant the troops on the 
communication, it would be little short of 
a miracle if bridges were not swept away 
or destroyed, embankments undermined or 
torn down, and rails pulled up, to the swift 
and complete dislocation of the whole of 
the military arrangements. 
Once again I venture to believe that a 
study of the figures belonging to this branch 
of the subject will relieve the fears of those 
who, from ignorance of the actual facts of 
military railway transit, havs allowed them- 
selves to be persuaded that the Russians 
are only waiting for the extension of their 
lines into Afghanistan to burnt like a resist- 
less torrent through the passes and spread 
themselves over Northern India. Even if 
a railway could hasten, instead of putting 
back the hour of the arrival of the invading 
army at Quetta, an zccurnulation of men 
and animals is not like an acculnulation of 
water, which gathers strength, as it rises. 
Let any number of troops you will accumu- 
late in a defile, they call only issue from it 
in a slender and harmless stream ; and the 
same is true of the desert through which 
the Itldus must be approached, whether the 
advance take place by the Gomul, the 
Thal Chotiali, or the Bolan. Nevertheless, 
I will now consider the whole question of 
the Invasion of India from the point of 
view of the Defence, as I have hitherto 
considered it from the point of view of 
the Attack, %it11 the object of showing 
that the frontier which we abandoned when 
Lorcl Lytton occupied Quetta, and which, 
year by year  and month by month, we are 
leaving further and further behind us, is the 
strongest with which any land has ever 
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been endowed, and the one which lends itself 
,most kindly to the far-reaching plans of the 
:strategist and the swift and sudden move- 
ments of the tactician. 
. .  
C H A P T E R  IV  
THE DEFENCE 
HAVING exmined the obstacles offered by 
Nature to a Russian invasion of India, and 
those which are inherent in the constitution 
of a large modern army, it remains to con- 
sider the artificial barrier against which that 
army's last strength would be  spent-in 
other words, to indicate the steps which the 
Indian Government would have to take to 
complete the work of disintegration and 
destruction which our allies, Fatigue and 
Siclrness, Hunger and Thirst, would have 
so well begun. Those steps need not be 
taken in haste-haste is often a blunderer 
and always 5 spendthrift -for we should 
have ample warning of the intended attack. 
The  preparations for it would be on so 
D8 
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gigantic a scale and so far-reaching in their 
effects, that concealment would be out of 
the question; even the line it was to follow 
could not continue long in doubt, since the 
immense distances between the different 
routes, and the urgent need that must exist 
in so poor a country as Afghanistan to 
start the troops and their endless train of 
followers and transport animals as soon 
as possible on their march towards our 
frontier, would compel the Russian com- 
manders to make their choice quicltly, and 
also to abstain from feints, manceuvres 
belonging rather to tactics than to strategy 
and quite inadmissible where the deceptive 
movement would remove the feinting force 
hundreds of miles from the road it was 
ultimately to pursue, and add enormously to 
commissariat and transport difficulties, as 
well as to those arising frsm the very 
narrow time limits within which the advance 
could be made at all. 
And if our preparations need not be made 
in  haste, neither need they be on a gigantic 
scale, and I do not '  say this under the 
vulgar British delusion that one English- 
man is as good as a dozen foreigners; I 
have every respect for Russian soldiers and 
for Russiaih generals, and, were we called 
upon to meet them on equal terms, I should 
agree wit11 Sir C. MacGregor that we ought 
to stand towards them in a relation of 
ilumerical superiority ; but there would be - 
no equality between our men, fresh, healthy, 
well supplied with every necessary ancl coin- 
fort, and the weary, hungry, sicltly Russian 
troops ; and still less equality between their 
position, toiling in small parties through 
a waterless1 desert, with their transport 
Poor in water as Nature has made the desert of 
Beluchistan, it y u l d  be our business to make it poorer 
still. The moment it became a certainty that a Russian 
army was on its way from Kandahar, the inhabitants of 
Dadar and all the villages on the caravan route would be 
removed, with their scanty belongings, to a place of safety 
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animals perishing by thousands, and their 
supplies running out day by day-and ours, 
behind the strong defences of Jacobabad, 
able to issue thence at will, and to over- 
wheIm each detachment before the next 
could come to its aid. 
The  following table gives the number of 
troops that I believe would be fouild quite 
adequate for the defence of our frontier, 
supposing the bulk of the Russian army 
to succeed in reaching it, ancl their disposi- 
tions on the hypothesis that its line of 
advance 'would be the Bolan. 
beliincl our line of defence, whilst their growing crops 
would be destroyed and  all their wells blown up or filled 
in. During the continuance of the campaign these poor 
people ~vould b e  lcept in cornfort, and at its close restored 
to their homes with a n  ample sup?ly of seed-corn, and 
provisions to keep them till the new crops could be reaped, 
our engineers having first reopened the wells. Of course 
the Russians could reopen them too, but at the cost of 
much time-some of them are ninety fiet deep-and time 
woulcl be the one th iag  of most importance t o  them.- 
H. B. H 
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DISTRIBUTION OF BRITISH ARMY O F  
DEFENCE. 
. .  Men. G u n q  
16 CavaIry Regiments, . 7,200 
4 Batteries, R.H.A., . 600 2 4  
24 Infantry Regiments, . 18,000 
4 Batteries, R.A., , 600 2 4  
Companies of ~appers, 300 
Reinforcements for or- 
I dinary garrison, , 5,000 - - 31,700 48 
24 Infantry Regiments, . 18,000 
4 Batteries, Field Artillery, 600 24 I 2 Companies of Sappers, zoo 
Sukkur. 1 Armoured Steamers carrying quick-firing guns, . - - 18,800 24 
I 4 Cavalry Regiments, . 1,800 I Battery, R.H.A., . 150 6 Rajan~ur 1 2  Infantry Regiments, . 9,000 Or at 2 Field Batteries, . 300 12 mtha*ot* 3 Companies of ~appers ,  300 
- 7 
11,550 18 
Carried forward, 62,050 go 
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Men. Guns. 
Brought forward, 62,050 go 
4 Cavalry Regiments, . 1,800 
I Battery, R.H.A., . 150 6 
Dera Ghazi I 12 Infantry Regiments, . 9,000 ~ h ~ ~ ,  2 Field Batteries, . 300 12 3 Companies of Sappers, 300 - - 11,550 18 
Lahore. 
rn 
8 Cavalry Regiments, . 3,600 
2 Batteries R.H.A,, . 300 12 
24 Infantry Regiments, . 18,000 
4 Field Batteries, . . Goo 24 
- - 
22,500 36 
I 4 Cavalry Regiments, . 1,800 I Battery R.H.A., . 150 6 
12 Infantry Regiments, . 9,000 
2 Fielcl Batteries, . . 300 12 
- - 
L Total, . 1og,3t;o 162 
T h e  map which will be kund at the I 
beginning of this Tract shows, in a clear I i 
and simple manner, the extraordinary 
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strategic excellence of the position which 
I have supposed our troops to occupy, 
every post fronr Pesllawar to Sukkur 
supporting and being supported by its 
neighbour, and all alilte being able to draw 1 i with speed and safety upon the great: arsenals I 
of Rawal Findi and Multan for military 
stores, and upon the rich country lying ~ 
around Lahore for grain and flour, whilst 
every district has its ow11 ample supply of 
corninissariat cattle. Sukkur and Jaco- . -. 
, , babad, where the largest concentration of 
I troops occurs, are doubly fortunate, in that 
I 
they can also supply their needs with 
I 
equal ease from Karachi and Bombay; 
and the same happy combination of road, 
rail, and river, which maltes the supply 
and transport question as s&imple in our 
case a s  it is difiicult in Russia's,' will give 
The Indus railway has but a single line, and runs 
through a barren land ; yet it can by no means be classed 
with the hypothetical Russian Icandahar-Quetta railway 
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to our commanders the power of modifying 
their dispositions at an hour's notice to 
meet any change in the Russian plan of 
advance, such, for instance, as the diversion 
of a portion of the invading force from the 
Bolan to the Thal Chotiali route, or an 
abandonment of the march og Jacobabad 
in favour of one on the Indus ferry at 
Mithankot. 
The collection and distribution of stores 
would be, of course, the Government of 
India's first concern, and every military 
post, from Peshawar to Sukkur, ought to 
as a hindrance rather than a help to the movement of 
troops ; because, firstly, running in either direction from 
any one of the strategical points which will require to be 
supplied and occupied, the pressure upon its cariying 
capacity is divided ; because, secondly, it does not stop 
short half-way ; because, thirdly, it is supplemented all 
along its course by a fair road and a splendid waterway; 
because, fourthly, the force to be moved by it is small in 
comparison wit11 the Russian army of0~~o,ooo  men ; and 
fifthly, because it lies entirely within our own territories, 
and is in no danger from the inhabitants, nor, except in the 
rains, from natural causes.--H. B. H. 
have a couple of months' supplies in hand 
before the movement of the troops begins ; 4 
and they, in their turn,chaving full command 
of trains and steamers (a steamer and its 
accompanying flat will convey a whole 
infantry regiment with its baggage down- 
stream, a t  t$e rate of from ten to fifteen 
miles an hour) should be carried to their 
respective destinations with such regularity 
and despatch, that there would be no 
necessity to expose them to siclrness by . - 
moving them before the rains had ceased, 
the  floocls subsided, and the danger to 
health from the concentration of large 
bodies of men had, to a great extent, dis- 
appeared. There should be no difficulty 
in throwing 4 c ~ o  to 5000 men daily into 
Sulrkur, supposing them to make use of 
I 
both river and rail, 'and to come partly 
from the Bombay Presidency, or from 
England direct, and partly from Multan 
and Lahore, where they would be replaced 
I 
I 
by troops drawn from stations farther 
south; and they could be pushed on to 
Jacobabad, by rail and ,road, certainly at 
the rate of 3000 a day. The  transport 
that would afterwards be required by the 
army in the field would more than suffice 
for the conveyance of the food and bag- 
gage of the regiments sent by road, as 
the distance between the two towns is so 
short, only 45$ miles, that the cavalry, at  
least, could accomplish it in two marches. 
Jacobabad, the point where, as a refer- 
ence to the map will show my readers, the 
Russiall forces and our own must come into 
contact, is a strategical position of extra- 
ordinary importance, which we will suppose 
to have been rendered thoroqgl~ly strong by 
military science and skill. Standing on the 
edge of the desert, it completely covers 
both the railway and the raised causeway 
which connect it with Sultltur; and it also 
commands the road from Dadar, the frontier 
road to Rajanpur, and the difficult and 
circuitous track from Quetta, pi2 Kelat 
and the Mula Pass, which joins the Dadar 
I 
route at Rajhan, one march north-west of 1 
; -- Jacobabad, of which the Russia~ls might 
avail themselves in order to relieve the 
congestion .consequent on the passage of 
vast multitudes through a single narrow 
defile. Here, in addition to an extra- 
ordinary garrison of 5000, I have placed a 
force of 26,700 men of all arms, specially 
strong in cavalry and horse artillery, whose 
part it will be to push forward into the 
desert as far as Rajhan, where it will 
effectually hinder a junction of the invaders, 
supposing a portion of them to have been 
sent vid Kela,t, and will be ready to fall . 
upon them at their weakest moment, when 
exhausted by fatigue and tormented with 
thirst, after a terrible march of 264 miles. 
Day by day, as each Russian detachment 
straggles into sight, it will be attacked in 
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front by the infantry and artillery in ex- i i ,  
I tended order, and taken in flank by the 
I i l  * 1 cavalry, whilst a couple of regiments will be I ' 1  
told off to sweep in such baggage as has I I/ 
.1L -, 11 escaped the ceaseless raids of our Beluch , I  I  
I I 
levies and of the Maris, Bughtis, and other 1 I \ 
I I 
predatory tribes, whose natural love of I 
? 
plunder will have been stimulated by 
promises of ample reward for services 
rendered to the British cause. A special 
service of mules, moving conti~lually be- , 
tween the fortress and the camp, will keep 
our army well supplied with food, water, 
and forage for the horses. 
Were there no Jacobabad to forbid all 
issue from the desert, Sulclcur, where the 
North-West Railway crosses, the Indus by 
a magnifiwnt cantilever bridge covered by a 
strong ttte dejont, and defended, probably, by 
armoured steamers carrying quick-firing gulls, 
would be quite equal to the task of guarding 
the passage of that river, since, in addition to 
the desert, it is protected by broad marshes 
ancl by a perfect network of inundation canals. 
As things are, S p k k ~ r ' s  only function will 
be to give shelter to  troops-all infantry and 
artillery-who may be required to reinforce 
Jacobabad or Rajanpur ; for how are the 
Russians to get near it, even supposing 
h 
us to have no army in the field? They 
cannot take Jacobabad by a coup de main ; 
with starvation staring them in the face, 
they cannot afford time to reduce it by regular 
siege operations ; they cannot invest it and 
cut off its supplies, because its calmon protect 
the railway and the road, and they cannot get  
behind it, except by the railway or the road, 
without plunging into a fetid s w a n ~ p . ~  T h e  
0 
< T h e  country as  far,,as the eye could r e e h  was a level 
swampy plain covered withp low aquatic jungle and marsh 
grass.'--Report of Surgeon-General A. Smith, C.B. 
'At the timc! of the passage of bur troops the water had 
subsided, hut the neighbourhood of the path was swampy, 
ancl in places very fetid, especially from putrid fishes left 
dry on the cessation of the inundations.'-Bid. 
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only course left open to their commander is 
to mask Jacobabad, which he will hardly 
venture to do with less ethan 50,000 men, 
and, by malring a detour through the desert, 
to reach the frontier road and march on the 
ferry at Mithanltot, 133 miles away, with 
the certainty that before l ~ e  can2rrive there 
the division at Rajanpur will have been 
quadrupled in strength by reinforcements 
sent from Lahore, Multan, and Sukliur, and 
that the armoured steamers are following 
l ~ i s  movements and may be counted on to 
prevent his ever throwing a pontoon across 
the 1ndus.l 
But no general, with hunger and disease 
decimating his ranlrs, and called upon each 
day to repel the attaclrs of as vigorous and 
active endny, will ever mask Jacobabad and 
march on Mithankot. ? His real choice, if 
he ever got within sight of the former place, 
The Indus is deep at all seasons o f  the year, and 
between Dera Ghazi IChan and Sukkur there are no fords. 
P 
would be between ,surrender and retreat ; 
and, considering the awful nature .of the 
sufferings which would await the hapless 
multitudes, armed and unarmed, committed 
to his charge, were he to embrace the latter 
alternative, there can be little doubt that 
he would accept the former, when, indeed, 
CI 
trouble and danger would begin for us 
- trouble in filling such innumerable 
moutl~s, da'nger from the typhoid and 
cholera that would be raging among our 
p-isoners. 
Against these two sources of danger I 
should warn the Indian Government t o  
make timely and ample provision, were it 
not that, as must be the case with all the 
preparations I- have been describing, that 
provision would be made in vair> Again, 
and with redoubled rboldness, I repeat my 
conviction, that we shall never have a 
Russian invasion of India to repel, 
There is no rz~shz.It,f into such a military 
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enterprise as the one I have been picturing to 
my readers ; its details must be worlred out, its 
cost counted, years before it can be begun. 
The strength of the British position would 
be well known to the Russian strategists 
intrusted with the drawing up of the plan 
of campaign, and their own annals can assist 
7 
them to judge of the condition in which 
their troops would arrive before it. Kauf- 
mann's march upon Khiva, in the spring of 
r 873, when he and all his force were oilly 
saved from dying of thirst and fatigue 
by the timefy intervention of a ' ragged 
Kirghiz,' who led them to some wells, and 
when, out of 10,000 camels, only 1 2 0 0  lived 
to reach the Oxus; and the experience of 
the two columils which were despatched, the 
one from"rashkend to Jam, the other from 
Petro-Alexandrovska tr, Charjui, in June 
1878, would sufice to lead thein to correct 
conclusions on this crucial point, even with- 
out the two object-lessons with which 
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England has kindly furnished them in 
Afghanistan itself. 
That Bengal cdumn of the Indus army 
of 1839, of which mention has twice been 
made, must have reckoned on reaching 
Kandahar within a month and a half, for i t  
took with it from Sukkur supplies for that 
length of time only, but it spent exactly 
nine weelzs on the way; and from this mis- 
calculation and from the incessant raids of 
Beluchis and Afghans, who carried off the 
laden camels from under the very noses of 
their escorts, it was reduced to the direst 
straits. During 48 days the mustered 
establishment (Government followers who, 
in the beginning, received the same allow- 
ance as the troops) were .on half rations, and 
t h e  troops themselves were on +he same 
footing during 28 days ; whilst, for the latter 
period of t ide ,  the private camp-followers, 
t o  whom, from the outset, only half the  
soldier's meagre fare was allotted, were 
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mulcted of the haIf even of that miserable 
pittance, and had to keep body and soul 
together on 4lb. of flour .and ioz. of dhal per 
diem.l The cavalry and artillery horses 
had had no grain for 27 days, and were in 
such a state of weakness on arriving at 
Icandahar that not a single troop was fit for 
detached duty.' History is silgnt as to the 
diet on which the transport animals were 
expected to bear their burdens, but it has 
preserved for us the fact that the 13,ooo 
men composing the two columns of Sir J. 
Keane's army lost, in the space of a single 
year, ~ 3 , o o o  cattle of all descriptions, 10,983 
of these being hired camels. 
In the second Afghan War, on the three 
lines of advance, forces numbering less than 
'Numb.frs of camp-followers were subsisting on fried 
skins of sheep, the coagulated blood of animals, and such 
8 
roots as they could pick up In the neighbourhood of the 
, 
encampments.'-Jfe~~zon'nIs of A fgham'stnn, by T. H. 
Stoequeler. The above facts are corroborated by Major 
Hough. 
"fie March of the I~zdr(s Arrny, by Major Hough. 
i 36,000 men lost, as we have already seen, 
50,ooo camels in eleven months ; and it took 
Sir D. Stewart's division of 7300 men 54 
days t o  move from Sulckur to Kandahar, I 
though there was no loitering by the way .u' 
and only one skirmish with the tribes. 
These facts, and others lilce them, must 
lead the Russian military experts to  results I 
differing materially from those which I have I/ 
submitted to my readers. They would per- 
'i 1 1 
ceive that if we could not send an army 
through the Bolan and across the desert of 
- 1  
BeIuchistan in bodies of 3000 fighting men, 
with all that that term implies, neither could 
they ; and would probably have to own that 
the commander would be luclcy who could 
squeeze his t rows through the one, and find 
water for them in the other, in det%chrnents 
of half that size; and this single change in 
the factors o$ my calculation adds 50 days 
to the roo which I assigned to the journey. 
Further, they would perceive, what indeed 
1 
I 
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I , I have already pointed out, that even a 
small a rm y  has, of necessity, its halts and 
1 
/ 1 
its delays, and they, cnuld not hide from 
t themselves the self-evident truth that a 
'P' large force must be far more exposed to re- 
tarding influences than a little one ; and so my 
second assumption that the Russians could 
move on in one unbroken stGarn, steadily 
advancing day by day., falls to the ground, 
ancl the 150 days to which the time occu- 
pied by tke march has grown must be still 
further extended. But every additional clay 
means additional supplies for' a quarter of a 
million of men and a mil~idn animals of one 
kindor another ; and every increaseof supplies 
means a n  increase in the means of transport;' 
and every increase . in the means of transport 
* 
It means also a large in~rease  in the number of camp- 
followers, since one muleteer must be allowed for every 
three mules, and one camel-mar,. to th% same number of 
camels used for the collveyallce of regimental baggage, or 
to every four camels used for carrying commissariat 
stores.-H. B. H. 
P 
puts  a fresh drag on the slow movements 
of the endless living train, winding pain- ( !  C 
fully between mouttaip walls, or clinging to 
the narrow traclc leading from well to well. 
A n d  they would have still to provide for 7 )  I 
I I 
t he  carriage of all those essential articles of 1 :   
food-meat, dead or alive, spirits, tea, sugar, 
hospital com!'orts, etc., which I have omitted 4 1  
from the dietary both of officers and men- i ' 
for I have put all, from the highest to the 
lowest, on the same low scale,-and, this . I \  . 
done, the insoluble problem of how to feed I \  . 
the camels that carry grain for the transport , I 
and baggage animals would 'remain to be g 1 
faced;  and yet another, a t  which I have , 
1 
hitherto only glanced, namely, how to time 
the invasion so*as to avoid floods in the 
Bolan, deadly heat in the *desert, a ~ , d  yet to . i ,  
I 
reach India-not the wilderness which forms r 
its outer zone, but the rich, populous India 
of their dreams-before the return of the 
ho t  weather shall close Beluchistan behind 
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them, leaving them, from the very outset of 
the campaign, cut off from all communicatioll 
with their base. T-he, margin is of the 
narrowest; for to reach Multan at the 
beginning of February, if the march is to 
take 180 days-and it cannot take less-the 
leading- detachments must start early in 
August, which would bring tl?em into the 
Bolan when innumerable torrents, born of 
the summer rains, are rushing down the 
mountain-sides, tearing great gaps in every 
road of man's construction, and filling the 
wide, stony channel of the river, which is 
the real passage througl~ the defile-and into 
the desert, when it is in its most pestilential 
s tate;  yet to delay till September means 
beginning their campaign in March, sup- 
* 
posing 01% generals were to permit them to 
approach R'lultan, within a month of the 
date when the desert again .becomes im- 
passable for rnan and beast. 
Can I now be  accused of presumption if 
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I declare my conviction that the Russian 
Government, whose military advisers should 
lay before it all these fwts and considerations, 
would abandon, once and for all, the dream 
of invading India, and turn its thoughts 
either towards indirect ways of injuring us 
and shaking our power in the East, or 
towards thenmore honourable measures by 
which- peace and good-will being established 
between two great Empires, separated from 
each other by the strong hand of Nature 
herself-both might profit by the good work 
already accomplished, or still to be accom- 
plished; by each. 
C H A P T E R  V 
THE I-IINDU ICUSI-I PASSES 
From Faizabad to Peshawar, vir2 the Dureand the Lahuri 
l'asses, 373 miles ; and fro111 Faizabad to Rashmir, vid 
t l~c I)um and the Borzil Passes, 029 miles. 
FRORI what distant regions the 30,000 men 
would originally be drawn, whom, in his 
plan of a general Russian advance upon 
India, Sir C. MacGregor assigned for the 
advailce upon Peshawar by Chitral, and 
upon Kashmir, by Gilgllit, is a question out- 
side the scope of this inquiry ; but there can 
be no dqubt that* the secckdary base of - 
forces illvading India, by either route, would 
be at Faizabad, in Badakshan, a dilapidated 
town1 on the Kokcha River, at the foot of 
I Faizabacl was . destroyed by Morad Bey, Chief of 
Kunduz, in 1821, and when visited, many years later, by 
01 
the I-Iindu Kush, and that, in the second 
instance, they would come from Tashkend 
and Marghilan. - 
The  Tashkend column, marching by way 
of Jam, would cross the Oxus by the Kilif 
ferry and proceed thence, by Balkh, Khulm 
(Tashkurghan), and ICunduz, to Faizabad, a 
journey of S18 miles, of the dificulties and 
hardships of which we can gain some ide"z1 
by turning back to the Russian papers of 
1878, ancl reacling'the accouilts of the suffer- 
\ 
ings which, in its first stage alone, a Russian 
division has already endured. From .them 
we learn what ravages the awful heat, the 
suffocating dust-s torms, ancl the scarcity of 
water made among both troops and trans- 
P 
Lieutenant J. I?. Wood, he found not a vEstigc of the 
ancient capital of Bada lss l~~n ,  save the witl~ered trees 
wliich once adorned its gardens, and the dilapidated walls 
of n fort rvhicll wts still standing on a rock comrnax~ding 
the entrance to the upper valley, herc only 400 yards 
wide ; since then, however, it has bee11 partially restored. 
-1-1. B. H. 
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port animals, the latter dwindling away till 
t l~cy could scarcely meet the requirements 
of the military train and ambulance; l. and 
there certainly cannot be less to bear between 
Jam and the Oxus, or on that strip of road, 
57 miles long, between Icilif and Balkh, 
where the whole country is so cut up by 
irrigation channels that two of the marches 
ate only three miles long, one five miles, 
and others l~arclly longer. 
The Marghilan column, marching by way 
of Ush and the Alai Valley, would effect the 
passage of the Oxus at Samti Bala. This 
route, tl~ough very circuitous, is somewhat 
The miseries of these unhappy troops seem to have 
culminated on their arrival at  Sarakul and Jam. 'Here 
began,' so wrote n corresnondent of the Sovn~zend lavestf, 
'privations &ich may well be termed diabolical. Imagine 
. to yourself a perfectly level sieppe, a heat of 499 degrees 
RCaumur, and a hot wind, and it was in this climate we 
had to remain more than a month. . . . Dysentery, typhus 
fever, and sunstroke were the inevitable results of a sojourn 
in such a climate. Soldiers' funerals were to be witnessed 
every day.' 
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shorter than that previously described ; still, 
5 7 1  miles is a considerable distance, re- a 
garded as the preliminary stage of a military 
movement, and the rugged mountain ranges, 
over which it is carried, must double the time 
that would be required to accomplish it in 
a n  ordinarily open and level country. 
t 
A third 3oute branching off from the 
Marghilan-Faizabad road, at  the head of 
the  Alai Valley, turns south over the Parnir 
I<hargosh, crosses the Murghab River, tra- 
verses the Alichur ancl Little Pamir, runs n 
down the Baroghil Pass, and lands the 
traveller in a district devoid of cultivation, 
grass, and fuel, with the choice of two paths 
open to  him, the one leading to Chitral, the 
other to Gilghit ; but this road I must 
decline even to consider -: a handfa1 of men 
might make their way along it, but hand- - 
fuls of men are not armies, and it is with 
armies that our problem is concerned. 
To return to Faizabad. Considering the 
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immense interval which separates that place 
i from Tashkend and Marghilan, and the 
* 
nature of the couiltry t h r ~ u g h  which it must 
be approached, I think it is safe to concIude 
that an army of any iillportance will take a 
whole summer to concentrate there. In 
addition, therefore, to the supplies necessary 
0 
for the second stage of their expedition, 
d l ~ i c h  will be begun the following year, as f 
. 4  
soon as the snow has disappeared from the a 
passes of the Hindu Kush, the Russian 
t troops must carry with them, or find 
collected at Faizabad, a sufficiency of pro- I 
i 
visions to support themselves and their 1 
transport during the intervening winter and 
spring ; and all supplies, whether intended 
\ 
for immediate or future use, must have been 
;i. 
brought from afar, as they will not be -! 
procurable either in the city, or in the district 9 
in which it is situated; and I need not say 
that, t o  keep open the army's communica- 
2, 
tions with R~lssia vi2 Tashkend-those viii 
Margllilan would be lost in winter-the 
whole of Afghan Turlristan, which would 
have been conquered- before either column 
began its advance, must be held in force, its 
, 
chief cities being not only occupied, but 
connected together by a chain of fortified 
posts. 
6, 
I will suppose that all these conditions 
have beell fulfilled, and that the two Russiai 
columns, their march safely accomplished, 
have spent the winter a t  Faizabad in peace 
and in tolerable comfort,-what is the task .. 
which would confront them when they again 
set themselves in motion ? 
They have, as we have seen, two objec- 
tives, Peshawar and Kashrnir : can these be 
attained in the eourse of + single summer? 
There are 41 marches from ~ Z z a b a d  to 
Gilghit, 19 to Chitrai, and fourteen to the ' 
northern end 6f theDura Pass,wllicll is 14,Soo 
feet high, only open for a little over three 
months in the year-let us say for a hundred i 
1 
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days-and so difficult, that, if I take 300 fight- 
ing men as the largest number that can cross 
it in a day, I shall probf~bly be exaggerating.' 
, By timing the start from Faizabad so as to 
bring the leading detachment to the foot of 
the pass the very day it becomes practicable, 
it will be just possible to get the whole 
C 
30,000 menb clear of it before it is again 
closed by snow, arid the first fifty detach- 
ments might concentrate at Gilghit on the 
g ~ s t  day, and the second fifty at Chitral on 
the 119th day. But between Gilghit and 
Kashmir are two formidable passes, the 
Borzil, 13,500 feet high, and the Hatu Pir, 
lower, but excessively difficult ; and between 
I 
Chitral and Peshawar there is the Lahuri - 
Pass, 10,450 feet ip height ;a so that farther 11 
advance 'by either route is impossible, and 
both columns inust speind a second winter by 
8 
1 There are three other passes bctwccn Badaltshan and 
Chitral, viz. the Agram, Kharteza, and Nuksan, but these 
are covered wit11 perpetual snow.-Mahamecl Ameen. 
G 
the way. Much more than a winter, indeed, 
since the advance could not be resumed 
before the May of .the following year;  and 
during the whole twelve months that these 
30,000 fighting men would be waiting or 
marching, they, and all the living creatures 
belonging to them, must be fed out of stores 
carried with them, or  previously accumulated 
. 
at Gilghit and Chitral, stores derived from 
that distant base, the locality of which we 
have not felt called upon to determine. 
Nay, more, provision must also have been 
made for the third stage of the movement, 
since there could be no lingering, after the 
southern passes were once more open, for 
fresh supplies to arrive; the advance must 
be immediate, the time in which it can be  
made being once again confined wfthin very 
narrow limits.' 
1 Last year 55300 maunds, equivalent to 27,500 mule 
loads of food-stuffs of all kinds, not including forage, were 
required for the provisioning of the 3 m  troops within the 
limits of the Gilghit agency. It is possible that each mule 
'a, 
~ " 4  
1 
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Many portions of the road from Faizabad 
to Chitral are swept, even in summer, by 
sudden and terrible storms, and the Kafir 
tribes bordering upon it are so fierce that 
the merchants who venture into these terrible 
regions absolutely prefer the Nuksan Pass to 
the Dura, though, in crossing it from the 
Badakshan side, they 'have to slide down 
upon the frozen snow on a leathern shirt, and 
ponies, if taken by this pass, are tied hands 
and feet, after having been relieved of their 
burden, and then rolled down upon the snow,' 
by which 'processes both men and beasts 
generally reach the base of the pass safely.'l 
Still, this march, as a whole, may be con- 
sidered easy compared to that from Chitral to 
made two kurneys, but% the Russians' case, for every 3000 
men 27,500 mules must be provided, since no second trip 
could be  made within the tilfie during which the Dura Pass 
remains open, and for the provisioning of 30,000, ten times 
that number of mules would be nec:ssary. Where are  
275,000 mules to be obtained? and if procurable, how are  
they to be fed?-H. B. H. 
Aiahamed Aneen. 
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Gilghit. Two mountain tracks collllect those 
two towns: the one vi2 the Jhui Pass-14,8 I 2 g-2 
feet high and very difficult-is quite imprac- 
ticable; the other by Mastuj, the Shundur 
- $4 
Pass, and Gakuch, although more direct and 
somewhat easier, bristles with difficulties, 
and to bring laden* animals safely over it, the f i  
? 
troops must be preceded by sappers and 
. t 
miners, who will have hard work to smooth 
away the worst of the obstacles. 
And when the Russian columns, or what :. I +  
. 2  
2 
remains of them, and their transport quit * f J  • 
i 1 
their tertiary base, and enter upon the last 
stage of their mighty adventure, it will be 
to encounter equal difficulties and fatigues 
and greater dangers. The Lahuri Pass, 
between Chitral and Peshayar, is intersected 
again and again by the bed of thi! torrent 
which drains it, and ih summer is strewn 
with the trunks and branches of deodar =0- 
and pine uprooted by the previous winter's 
storms ; whilst the low - lying, swampy 
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valleys1 between the pass and British terri- 
tory, always unhealthy, are during the hot 
weather unbearably elose and sultry, more 
oppressive than the plains of ~ddia.  
The  leading Russian detachments would 
probably meet with strong resistance on the 
Lahuri and a t  Dir, a large mud fort cover- 
ing the populous village of Arian Koh ; and 
beyond Dir, in Swat, they would come into 
collisioll with the warlike Yusafzai Tribes, 
one of which, the Bunerwals, can put 8000 
fighting men into the field.2 They it vas who, 
Large quantities of rice are grown in these valleys.-- 
H. B. H. 
a Lieutenant A. H. Mason, R.E., Record of Exfleditions 
agai?zst the Nortk- West Frontier Tn3e.r. Colonel War- 
burton, however, estimates the Bunerwals fighting strength 
a t  15,000. 'There is,'*he says, ' noafiner race in the north- 
west frontier of India than the Bunerwals. Simple and 
austere in their habits, religious and truthful in their ways, 
hospitable to all who seek shelter amongst them, free from 
secret assassinations, they are brigh? examples of what 
good materials a Pathan tribe can develop into, clinging 
with the fondest affection to their country, and ancient 
customs handed down to them by their forefathers.' 
at the Ambela Pass in the year r 863, held 
6032 British ancl Native troops, under Sir  i d  
Neville Chambel-lain, in check for nearly 
two months,' inflicting upon them a loss in 4 
liillecl and wounded of 67 officers and 841 1 
men. The expedition was not even directed 
against the Bunerwals, but against the refi-ac- 
:q 4 I 
tory Hindustani fanatics who had settlecl a t  
Mallta; yet these independent and high- 
spirited mountaineers refused it a passage 
through their land. Are they more likely to I 
I 
grant one to Russian troops, who, hundreds a , 
of miles from their base, and broken up into 1. I 
weak detachments, would be far less capabIc j 
of enforcing their demand ? 
And how are the invaders to cross the 
Swat, a deep and rapid riyer, 450 feet wide, 
from which every native skiff would have 
F 
been removed, and do&inated by the British 
fort of Abaza?? Are we to suppose that 
an expedition which had needed three suc- I 
1 
cessive summers for its accornplisl~rnent, i 
! 
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would have been so s~~ccessfully concealed 
from the Indian Government that no British 
force would be waiting to overwhelm the 
Russiails as they set foot on Brltish soil ? 
And beyond the Swat River and Fort 
Abazai is a branch of the Kabul River, 
fordable, indeed, except after heavy rain, but 
defended by Fort ~habkadgr ; and eight 
miIes further still there is the Nargumail 
branch of the same stream ; and ten miles 
beyond that the large cantonment of Pesha- 
war, connected by rail with every part of 
India. S o  that, by this route as by the 
Bolan, the onIy question for us wouId be 
where to crush our foes, and, for them, 
whether death or surrender slzould be their 
choice; and if they were 50,000 strong 
instead* of rg,ooo, with the facilities for 
concentrating troops at  Peshawar which 
we possess, the result must still be the 
same. 
The road from Gilghit to Kashmir is 
much better known than that from Chitral 
' to Peshawar, but, in this case, familiarity has 
not bred contempt.. : No one who has not 
visited these' inhospitable regions,' so wrote 
in 1893 a traveller who has a wide personal 
experience of them, 'can fully realise the 
difficulties which beset the organisation of 
even the smanest military expedition. The 
road from' Kashmir to Gilghit, roughly, is 
240 miles in length, and traverses, for the 
most part, a practically desert country. All 
supplies have to be carried up from Kashmir, 
while even the grass to feed transport 
animals has to be brought from a distance. 
In the summer the heat in the arid gorges 
is intense, and in some of the waterless 
marches the b o ~ e s  of dead mules are a 
b 
frequent sight. The road becomes "Impass- 
able in early winter (October), for two passes 
have to be cr~ssed, both liable to sudden 
1 Mr. E. F. Knight, the author of Where Three Ew#~es 
Meet. 
crales of deadly coldness, which surprise I I b 
),-a and kill numbers of travellers every year. :I 
Last autumn one of. Lhese gales, accom- li 1 
pallied by a snowstorm, destrofed a whole : 
I 
1 
I train of 300 mules, together with their tl 
drivers. ' I 
13 A similar disaster which happened in the 






will be still fresh in the memory of many of 1 
I my readers, when a detachment of Goorkl~as, 
I 
uncler Captain Barnett, was caught in a 
, 
I) . blizzard. About 100 men and followers, I 
Barnett amongst the number, were frost- 
bitten, many of whom died afterwards at 1 
Astor, while the hands and feet of others 
dropped off. Their gallant leader, after a i __J I 
protracted illness, recovered, not however 1 
I 
without ?he loss of several toes. I 
T h e  prospect of sdch dangers and hard- 
ships will quicken the movements of the 
i 
I i 
Gilghit column, and it would be pleasant for I ' 1  
' I  
them, on arriving on the north-east margin 1 I , 
0 
n 
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of Lake Wular, to take to the water and 
float quietly down to Srinagar; but I fear 
they would hardly find boats waiting to 
convey theh. Whether they approach that 
city, however, by land or by water, they 
will certainly enter it only as prisoners of 
f I  
1 i 
! $ A , ,  a war, f i r  to have assembled there a force of 
1 ; ;  double theirqstrength, would have been no * 
excessive strain on the resources of the 
Indian Government, especially if, by the date 
of our hypothetical Russian invasion, that 
government had ceased to value railways in 
proportion to their uselessness and unre- 
munerativeness, and had constructed that 
line from Rawal Pindi to Kashmir, the plans 
and estimates for which have long been in 
its possession. 
11  . i' There are really two routes fro: Chitral 
1 ;  j i  2 ' to-~eshawar ,  but as 'the second joins the 
I Khyber at Jdalabad, and the mouth of the 
Khyber will have been sealed by that 
fortified camp, in the teeth of which Sir E. 
8 
I-Iamley failed to see how a single Russian 
F regiment could ever issue from that deep 
and narrow gorge, it would be waste of time 
to describe it here ; but it will not be useless 
:4 
to recall the terms in which the above- 
* named strategist spoke of the expectation 
F 
A that, through it, danger might some day 
* I '  threaten India. 
Why, he asked, in a lecture to which I 
have more than once referred-why shoulcl 
Russia push her forces to the sources of the 
i 
I Oxus, cross the Hindu Kush, and march 
2 50 miles down the Kunar Valley to reach 
t Kabul or the Ichyber, when she could attain 
either objective by shorter and better roads? 
If she held the less difficult, she would have 
no need to use the-more difficult roads ; and 
if she d:d not hold the former, she could fy '. 
not risk an advance'by the latter. Why, 
- then, should she be supposed capable of 
entering ' on such an enterprise by such a 
i, 
line ' ? 
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Why, indeed ? And why should she be 
expected to commit the same folly by any 
other circuitous and~hspelessly difficult route? 
The answgr is simple : Because we English , 
. 
are fools : not the Russian Government-that d i4 
is wise enough in its generation, and has no 3 
more idea of invading India by the Hindu 4 
. . 
Kush than Gf organising an expedition for 
the conquest of Canada viii; Siberia, though ;+ 
to further her general policy of inducing us 
to weaken our military position in India, by . 
scattering our troops over an enormous and al- e 
most inaccessible area, and our political posi- 
tion, by forcing us to tax our Indian subjects 
to the last limit of their patience and their 
purse, she sends from time to time a score 
or two of Cossacks to 40 a little hunting 
and exploring in those uncoLfortable 
r' 6 
regions. t 
It  is enough to make any reasonable w 
Englishman blush with shame, to think that 
the well-being of our Indian Empire is being 
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sacrificecl to absurd and ignorant fears-fears 
that are making oi England the cat's-paw of 
the government wllose aims she is supposed 
to be circumventing, and the laughing-stock 
of every foreign military man who happens 
to turn his attention to such remote and 
negligeable places as  Chitral, or Gilghit, or 
the Pamirs, 
0 
I 1;now well the arguments by which this 
\veal; and foolish policy is defended : that 
we must keep the coming struggle well away 
from our ow11 borders; that we must carry 
war into the enemy's country ; that we must 
reduce to submission all the petty tribes of 
which we  have ever heard the name, lest, in 
our hour of danger, they should pour down 
from their hills and divide *and brealr our 
strength,' But I claim to have shown ' 
that, so far as  Russia it concerned, the pften 
~redicted struggle could not touch the outer- 
most fringe of our Indian Empire, and that 




r r I 
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n 
than she into ours; and as regards dis- 
turbances that may arise within our own .-aJ 
borders, I believe ?I can dissipate that 
anxiety allo, or a t  least prove that it derives 
most of its probability and all its real force 
from the very measures that we are asked 
t o  think: necessary to its relief. But this C 
' 6' . 
subject, no less important than that to which 
the  present paper has been devoted, must 
wait till, in Tract No. 2, I have examined 
the  frontier with which India is at this - 
moment blessed, and that wider frontier, t o  n - 
which the most anxious of her many anxious 
friends, from Lord Lytton and Sir George 
Colley down to Lord Roberts and Mr. 
George Curzon, have invited her to look 
forward as the best security that their 
CI 
military and political foresight can promise 
m -  
her ; and have submitted t o  my readers many 
curious and instructive facts with regard t o  
t he  defensive works-fortifications, strategic 
roads and strategic railways-which are 
I 
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absorbing so large a proportion of India's 
revenues, and also with regard to what, I 
suppose, I must call .the defensive wars, 
which, equally with the works,' owe their 
existence to that ' scientific ' conception. 
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